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I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 18, 1975, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission rendered the first decision pursuant to
Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1970.1a
This section is unique in that it requires that every applicant for a
license or permit to construct or operate any nuclear power facility

undergo pre-licensing antitrust review. This review is intended to
ascertain whether the granting of the requested license or permit will
create or maintain a situation which is inconsistent with the antitrust
laws. Accordingly, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Antitrust Counsel, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division Chief
in charge of Regulated Industries, and the public were invited to file
petitions if those parties believe that the granting of such license or
permit will create inconsistencies with the antitrust laws.
The July 18th decision came as a result of petitions filed with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter N.R.C.] by the Staff
Counsel, the Department of Justice, and twenty-nine utilities [hereinafter "intervenors"] all alleging that the granting of the requested
permit would create inconsistencies with the antitrust laws. The last of
these petitions was filed in October of 1971. Hundreds of thousands of
pages of documents were exchanged in the discovery process, and
almost 15,000 pages of testimony were recorded at the hearings. The
case actually began in early 1969, when Consumers Power Company,
the applicant, filed application for permits to construct and operate two
nuclear units, known as Midland I and II. with the combined generating
capacity of over 1,300 megawatts (MW).
*Much of the research and writing in this article was prepared by Professor Popper
in his master's program at George Washington University, National Law Center, and was
in part presented in his thesis study, "The Competitive Implications of Section 105(c) of
the Atomic Energy Act - In the Matter of Consumers Power," May 10, 1976, George
Washington University, Washington. D.C
**Motor Carrier Lawyers Association Chair in Transporation Law, University of
Denver; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver; B.A., Bladwin Wallace College
(1970); J.D., DePaul University School of Law (1973); LL.M., George Washington
University National Law Center (1976).
la.

42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1970).
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As the case developed, and continues to develop, the parties divided
into two groups, with the applicant utility on one side, and the N.R.C.,
Department of Justice, and intervenors on the other.
This article discusses In the Matter of Consumers Power Co.,
Midland Plant, Units I and II 2a in a historical sense, from an overall
statutory standpoint, a technical standpoint, and a legal perspective. No
attempt is made to cover all the ramifications of the deci sion. Indeed it
may take years to ascertain what the ramifications are as a result of this
decision.
The decision is a landmark one, for it sets out for the first time
standards to be applied in an administrative-regulatory pre-licensing
antitrust review. Such reviews may soon be commonplace in many
federal agencies, as they provide an excellent opportunity to arrest in
their incipiency anticompetitive practices which will later become,
or
3
already are, injurious to the economy and the public interest
II.

STATEMENT OF THEORY

The economic market structure of the electric utility industry
reflects a two-fold pattern: a trend toward increased concentration and
increased intersystem coordination, and increased problems in the
maintenance of organizational diversity. Meaningful competition can
exist if both of these patterns are maintained and controlled. Increased
concentration will place demands on the competitive structure and
destroy that structure if there is no effective enforcement of the
2,1k
3a

N.R.C. Doe. 50-329A and 50-330A; LBP; NRCI 75-7 at 29 (1975).
I appeared as co-counsel for the Atomic Energy Commission in the Consumers

proceeding. (The Atomic Energy Commission ceased to exist as a regulatory agency in
1974. The regulatory responsibilities were assumed in that year by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (40 F.R. 8774,
March 3, 1975)).
A considerable portion of the strategy, trial work, and brief writing was done by
Mr. Robert Verdisco, N.R.C. Staff Counsel, Antitrust Section. His ideas and leadership
were an inspiration. Extensive reference is made to pleadings prepared by the N.R.C.
staff, by the Staff of the Public Counsel Section of the Department of Justice, and by the
intervenors in the Consumers case. I extend my deepest appreciation to the various
individuals who, with Mr. Verdisco and me, filed the hundreds of pages of pleadings and
memoranda which were used in the case and in this article.
It should be noted at the outset that this document is by no means an endorsement
or criticism of nuclear power as a safe means of generation. I am neither qualified nor in a
position where I can assess safety, reliability, or other health hazards which may be
related to nuclear power electric generation. For the purposes of this article, nuclear
power is viewed as "special," not because it is environmentally sound or ecologically
advisable, but because it represents the most modern and most expensive component in
the United States arsenal of electric power generation.
Any criticism of any individuals is intended in a purely professional or academic
sense. While I am highly critical of the decision in the Consumers case, such evaluations
are in no way intended as personal condemnations of individuals or of the Consumers
Power Company. Indeed, the Federal Administrative Law Judges who wrote the opinion
faced an almost impossible task with dignity and tremendous energy.
I am solely responsible for the contents of this article. The opinions are mine, and
not those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or any of its staff. I take full
responsibility for all statements herein.
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antitrust laws. This enforcement should not be directed at the
prevention of concentration, for concentrated and coordinated systems
are essential to maintain the necesary economies which make large unit
power generation possible. Rather, the enforcement should be directed
toward preserving a diverse organizational structure which in turn will
guarantee yardstick competition, and actual competition in the wholesale bulk power market. The decision in In the Matter of Consumers
Power, Midland Units I and II is a step away from the concepts
enumerated above, is inconsistent with the ends of a competitive
market, and has the potential of legitimating non-competitive oligopoly
for various regulated industries.
III.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

On July 18, 1975, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided In the Matter of Consumers
Power Co.,' a monumental antitrust decision which is discussed at
length in the following sections. Briefly, the Board held that a dominant
entity in a given geographic market which controls a scarce and unique
coordinating medium (all high voltage transmission facilities in lower
Michigan) has no obligation to participate in coordinated operation with
dependent smaller entities which rely on such coordination for their
continued survival. 2 The Board also held that such coordination could
not be directed, without taking into account the net benefits which could
be derived by the dominant entity.3 Further, the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board found that a nexus had to be established between
activities sought to be licensed (meaning the operating or generating
facility) and the alleged inconsistencies with the antitrust laws, before
any relief could be considered. The question which must be discussed is
whether these formulations are consistent with established law and
principle.
The promise of the antitrust laws has always been open to public
question. 4 The very earliest criticism of the application of those laws
came from the muckrakers who sold their "sordid stories [not] just
for their shock value, but that they would be filled with the desire to do
something about corrupt bosses, sweated labor, civic decay, monopolistic extortion." 5 Men like Walter Lippman voiced realistic criticism of
those charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws:
They [the trustbusters] would make impossible any deliberate and
constructive use of our natural resources, they would thwart any effort
to form great industries into coordinated services, they would... lay a
premium on the strategy of industrial war.'
4a.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

N.R.C. Doc. 50-329A and 50-330A; LBP; NRCI 75-7 at 29 (1975).
N.R.C. Doc. 50-329 and 50-330A; LBP-75-39 NRCI 75-7 (1975).
Id. at 112-14.
Id.
WILSON'S PUBLIC PAPERS, Inaugural Address of March 4, 1913.
R. HOFSTEADER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 5 (1963).
W. LIPPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 124 (1914).
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The era of the 1890's was one of Progressivism in a very narrow
sense. However, the compelling political reality was well recognized. It
involved "the fear that great business combinations, being the only
centers of wealth and power, would be able to 'Lord it over' all other7
interests and thus.., put an end to traditional American democracy."
The resentment of the trusts was greatest at the level of the small
entrepreneur, who was plagued by the realization that these trusts
effectively destroyed any potential of growth beyond the single level of
retail, wholesale, or general distribution. Such concerns were halfheartedly taken up as a campaign issue by President Woodrow Wilson
in 1912, who declared a soft war on the trusts by announcing "a
crusade against powers that have governed us-that have limited our
development-that have determined our lives-that have set us in a
straightjacket to do as they please.... This is the second struggle for
emancipation.... If America is not to have free enterprise, then she can
have freedom of no sort whatsoever."
President Wilson was not particularly successful in his efforts.
Indeed, there is reasoned speculation that the market crash of 1929 was
in part a result of that failure to enforce the antitrust laws and insure
actual competition.9
To understand the market philosophy in the Consumers Power case,
it is instructive to review American business psychology in the period
between 1910 and 1929. "Historically, individual enterprise has been
at a premium. For the many tasks that cannot be handled by
individuals, Americans have preferred to found voluntary group
associations."' 0 Likewise, local governments have been preferred over
the federal government for control purposes." This same fear of size
and authority in government was evident regarding "big business."
Such fears were not without some statistical basis. A large eastern
railroad corporation had Boston offices which employed 18,000 people
and paid top employees in excess of $35,000, while the whole of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts employed less than 7,000 people, and
receipts for the Commonwealth
had a salary ceiling of $6,500. Gross
12
were 18% of those of the railway.
These statistics were easily understood by the voting population,
and the desire for controlling dominant corporate entities in various
markets became a common political rallying cry. Senator Robert La
Follette carefully established the political hazards of dominance alone
the negative economic consequences, a novel theory in this
along with
3
period.1
R. HOFSTEADER, THE AGE OF REFORM 227 (1955).
8. A. LINK, WILSON, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 514 (1947).
9. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 183-91 (1954).
10. R. HOFSTEADER, AGE OF REFORM 229; see also, 42 CONG. REC. 3450 (1908).
7.

11. Id.
12.
13.

C.W. ELLIOT, AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVILIZATION 85-87 (1907).
42 CONG. REC. 3450 (1908).,
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A congressional investigation found, for example, that the Morgan
Investment Corporation controlled 341 directorships in 112 major
corporations, and had direct influence over $22,245,000,000 in aggregate corporate assets.1 4 This was three times the assessed value of all
real and personal property in New England, or more than the total
value of all property in the twenty-two states west of the Mississippi
River. "[W]idespread and urgent fear of business consolidation and
private business authority"'15 resulted in a series of rulings by courts
which were designed to check dominance, concentration, and oligopoly.
The decision in Consumers Power constitutes a variation from this
history. It affirms the concept that efficiency which results in cost
savings to the "public at large" by virtue of scaled economics is the
primary goal of regulation, notwithstanding the impact that the
efficient entity has had on competing entities within the same market.
This was not the law in 1912, and it. is not the law today.
Impact analysis of dominance does not, however, follow from the
enforcement of the early antitrust laws. President Woodrow Wilson had
"fabricated the New Freedom program ... largely out of promises to
destroy monopoly and restore free competition.' ' 16 However, early
politics of his administration prevented effective legislation, as was
required to carry out such a promise. In late 1913, a coalition of
progressive Republicans and later-day granger Democrats began a
move toward the creation of an independent and forceful trade
commission which would have rule-making and quasi-judicial powers,
and which would be free to define and regulate restraints of trade
outside of the Sherman Act. 17 Congressmen toiled at length over the
question of whether to define all restraints, or to generally outline the
parameters of unlawful dominance. 8 While President Wilson favored
an exceedingly detailed act, such was wisely avoided and section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(1)(a)) simply
condemned all unfair methods of competition. Parenthetically, the most
serious challenge to the bill was not by the vested trust interests, 19 but
rather from Samuel Gompers and the forces of organized labor.2"
Gompers was appeased when a proposed amendment was introduced
which read: "The labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of
commerce .. ."21

LINK].

14.

L.

BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

15.

R.

HOFSTEADER, AGE OF REFORM

22-23 (4th ed. 1932).

16.

A.

LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

232-34; see also, supra note 13.

62 (1954) [hereinafter

17. See Memorandum of J.F. Davis to Wilson, Dec. 27, 1913, WILSON'S PUBLIC
PAPERS; Memorandum of Recommendations as to Trust Legislation by Joseph E.
Davies, Commissioner of Corporations, LINK, supra note 16.
18. House Judiciary Committee, Trust Legislation Hearings, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914).
19. It is well known, however, that the finest finance minds, among them Samuel
Utermeyer, rushed to Washington to privately lobby against the bill. LINK, supra note 16.
20. NEW YORK WORLD, Mar. 1, 1914, at 1.
21. See Labor is Not a Commodity, 9 NEW REPUBLIC 112 (1916).
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With the Federal Trade Commission Act, a new era of administraConsumers Power marks a
tive decisional responsibility began.
deviation from this responsibility, notwithstanding specific legislative
direction to the various22 atomic safety and licensing boards to follow
section five of the Act.

Parenthetically, it is a minor historical aberration that Wilson
signed the Federal Trade Commission Act. Indeed, "[h]ow the
President was won over to the idea of a strong trade commission is
nowhere evident. '23 In its early years, the FTC was shown to be a
"with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and an anemic
toothless tiger
''24
appearance.
President Wilson was later evaluated as weak and uncommitted to
the competitive model, 25 and it was speculated that an inner distrust of
free enterprise provoked him to sign a measure which had the potential
to be meaningless. 26 It is equally possible that President Wilson was
that
frightened from his posture of economic reform by a depression
27
began in 1913 and continued through the 1916 election.
Regardless of why President Wilson signed the Act, and how the
Commission gradually gained power, it is now history as well as legal
precedent, that a dominant entity which refuses to participate in
coordinated operations and refuses to allow access to a scarce resource,
thus maintaining its dominance, has acted in a manner inconsistent
with section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Until the
Consumers Power decision, such conduct was sanctioned by courts or
administrative bodies.
The desire to control single business dominance neither began nor
ended with President Wilson. As the president who signed the Federal
Trade Commission Act, he merits mention, since the Consumers Power
decision is in many ways a section five case, as well as a §105(c) licensing
hearing.28 Twenty years prior to the Federal Trade Commission Act,
Governor Knute Nelson of North Dakota, began a campaign to
revitalize, redefine, and supplement the then four-year-old Sherman
Act.2 9

His cause was taken up by the Progressive Party, and

30
particularly Henry Demarest Lloyd and David Waite.
Their purpose was to insure that the "new industrialism" would
become an asset, creating new opportunity, or at a minimum, not
destroying existing competitive markets. However, it would be naive to
22.
23.
24.
25.

S. REP. No. 1247, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-36 (1970).
LINK, supra, note 16, at 72.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1914.
LINK, supra note 16, at 74.

26. W.C.

REDFIELD, WOODROW WILSON: AN APPRECIATION (Baker Collection,

Library of Congress).
27. LINK, supra note 16, at 75.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (c).
29. St. Paul Representative, Apr. 18, 1893; Donnelly Scrapbooks, Vol. 14.
30. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT 290-97 (1961).
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argue that the "unifying theme of American history between 1885 and
1914 .... was a popular attack against corporate wealth."' 3 1 The social
and political motivations of the drafters of the antitrust system involved
controlled expansion, not suppression, of corporate power.32 Antitrust
laws were as much a reaction to the urban-rural conflict as to the pure
economic fears of Senator Clayton. Industrialism brought with it mass
change, displacement, loss of familiar surroundings, and the antitrust
laws were and are an attempt to regulate and control this inevitable
growth. Accordingly, a factor that enters every antitrust decision must
be: Will the challenged activity, practice, or situation alter economic
trends in favor of a single entity at the expense of others who provide a
buffer for the maintenance of an existing market? If so, then the
activity requires a direct remedy.
The 1914 antitrust attitude of controlled expansion waddled through
the 1920's growing slowly in definition of "unfair practice" and the "per
se" doctrine. 33 The 1930's and the New Deal brought out public
sentiment regarding the necessity of regulation to create markets,
rather than allowing natural forces the time to create competition and
cost-efficiency. Historian A. A. Berle, Jr. stated the theory of increased
regulation, including antitrust enforcement at the administrative level,
thusly:
Only after the entire industry has been bankrupt, do inefficient
plants actually begin to go out of business. This process may take
fifteen or twenty years, during which time the capital, the labor, the
customers, and the industry generally suffer from the effects of a
disorganized and unsound condition.
The old economic forces still work and they produce a balance after
a while. But they take so long to do it they crush so many men in the
process that the strain on the social system becomes intolerable.
Leaving economic forces to work themselves out as they now stand will
produce an economic balance, but in the course of it you may have half
of the entire country begging in the streets or starving to death.
The New Deal may be said to be merely a recognition of the fact
that human beings cannot indefinitely be sacrificed by millions to the
operation of economic forces accentuated by this factor of organization
34

This sentiment was followed by the courts, though the historical
perspective on the antitrust system remained constant. By 1939, the
war economy had become vested, and more concern could be given to
35
actual prosecution.
31. S.P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 189 et seq. (1957).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
and the following cases through 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
34. Berle, The Social Economics of the New Deal, THE NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, Oct. 29, 1933.
35. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Fashion
Originator Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208 (1939): United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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A series of protracted hearings in the early 1950's resulted in
hundreds of section five decisions through the middle sixties. Since that
time, no change in basic philosophy regarding expansion control and
oligopoly has occurred. Entities which participate in maintenance of
their oligopolistic position by denial of access to unique or scarce
resources are generally prosecuted. 36 It is only with the Consumers
Power decision that a change may have taken place.
IV. THE REGULATORY SCHEME
A.

Applicability of the Antitrust Laws

In the Matter of Consumers Power Company, Midland I and IP7 was
decided by a licensing board comprised of two federal administrative
38
law judges, Hugh Clark, chairman, and J. Venn Leeds, Jr., member.
The review took place pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
which was amended in 1970.39 Section 105(a) specifically sets to rest any

idea that those applying for an operating license, or those actually
operating a facility are exempt from any antitrust laws:
§ 105(a) Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any person from the
operation of the following Acts, as amended, "An Act to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies"; An Act to
reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes"; "An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes"; and "An Act to
create a Federal Trade Commission to define its powers and duties, and
for other purposes." In the event a licensee is found by a court of
competent jurisdiction ... to have violated any of the provisions of such

laws in the conduct of the licensed activity, the Commission may
suspend, revoke, or take such other action as it may deem necessary
with respect to any 40license issued by the Commission under the
provisions of the Act.

[Citations omitted.]

This section eliminates the possibility of antitrust immunity which
may have come up by virtue of the "regulated" status of a license
applicant. While Parkerv. Brown 41 arguments regarding exemptions
have surfaced in Consumers and other cases 42 based on the degree of

regulation which occurs at the state level, such arguments do not apply
to the interstate wholesale power exchange market. This is particularly
true in light of Federal Power Commission v. Southern California
Edison Co. 43 which forbids single state regulation of regional power
36. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377(1956),
with United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
37. Supra note 6.
38. The panel which heard the case was comprised of three members, but in late
1974, the original Board Chairman Jerome Garfinkel was tragically killed in an
automobile accident.
39. Atomic Energy Act of 1970 § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1970).
40. Id.
41. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
42. In re Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., Davis Bessie Station 50-346; LBP 74-24
(1974).
43. 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
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exchange. Further, while section 205 of the Federal Power Act" grants
rate jurisdiction to the Federal Power Commission, it is in no way a
grant of immunity from outside antitrust review.4 5
By enacting section 105, Congress determined that any entity which
seeks to become involved in nuclear power generation in the United
States will have to undergo a pre-licensing antitrust review. Such
mandate is not unreasonable, particularly since Congress has in effect
given the private concerns billions
of dollars in publicly funded
46
research and development assets.

Our reading of the legislative history of the antitrust provisions of
the Act convinces us that the primary impetus for the injection of
antitrust considerations into the nuclear licensing process was the
deeply held concern of Congress that the huge public investment in the
research and development of nuclear reactor technology should not be
utilized by a few leading private47 firms to entrench themselves in an
anticompetitive market position.
Apart from the rationale which dictates that public assets should not be
used for the competitive benefits of private investor owned utilities,
there is strong legal precedent which requires the application of the
antitrust laws to a number of regulated industries. 48 Moreover, there
have been specific applications to the electric utility industry in Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States49 which involved an unlawful denial of
coordination much like that in Consumers.
B. The Standardsfor Prosecution - General
Section 105(c) is the heart of the legislation since it establishes a
standard and a procedure to be used in administrative antitrust
reviews. It is comprised of eight subparts which establish the
relationship between the Antitrust Division at the Department of
Justice and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Antitrust Staff. The
relationship with the United States Attorney General is set out in
subpart 1:
C. (1) The Commission shall promptly transmit to the Attorney
General a copy of any license application provided for in paragraph (2)
of this subsection, and a copy of any written request provided for. in
44. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
45. Pretrial Brief for Applicant, In re Consumer Power Co., Midland Units I & II,
50-329A, 50-330 A (1973).
46. See generally, U.S. Atomic Energy Legislation through the 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Joint Committee Report, 9 PO 5270-01753 at 101-203.
47. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), AFC
Doc. Nos. 50-348 A and 50-364 A, Memorandum and Order, 14-16 (Feb. 9, 1973).
48. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651(1964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962);
Untied States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. of America, 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
383 (1912); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
49. 410 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1973) [hereinafter Otter Tail].
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paragraph (3) of this subsection; and the Attorney General shall, within
a reasonable time, but in no event to exceed 180 days after receiving a
copy of such application or written request, render such advice to the
Commission as he determined to be appropriate in regard to the
finding to be made by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (5)of this
subsection. Such advice shall include an explanatory statement as to
the reasons for basis therefor."
The receipt of a letter of advice of the Attorney General is the
beginning of actual prosecution for the Nuclear Regulatory Commis51
sion.
Subparts two and three set up two exceptions to pre-licensing
review.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall apply to an application
for a license to construct or operate a utilization or production facility
under section 103 [103 facilities are pure research institutes] Provided,
however, That paragraph (1) shall not apply to an application for a
license to operate a utilization or production facility for which a
construction permit was issued under section 103 unless the Commission determines such review is advisable on the ground that significant
changes in the licensee's activities or proposed activities have occurred
subsequent to the previous review by the Attorney General and the
Commission under this subsection in connection with the construction
permit for the facility.

(3) With respect to any Commission permit for the construction of
a utilization or production facility issued pursuant to subsection 104b.
prior to the enactment into law of this subsection, any person who
intervened or who sought by timely written notice to the Commission to
intervene in the construction permit proceedings for the facility to
obtain a determination of antitrust considerations or to advance a
jurisdiction basis for such determination shall have the right, upon a
written request to the Commission, to obtain an antitrust review under
this section of the application for an operating license. Such written
request shall be made within 25 days after the date of initial
Commission publication in the Federal Register of notice of the filing of
date of
an application for an operating license for the facility or the
2
enactment into law of this subsection, whichever is later5
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)1.
51. For the 70 applications that have been received, license conditions have been
required, through hearing or settlement, in well over half of the cases, to remedy a
situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
52. The date of the amendment was December 19, 1970. Thus, all permit or license
applications filed before that date are considered "grandfathered," or exempt from
prelicensing review, but subject to post licensing review. This is expanded in Subpart 8:
"(8) With respect to any application for a construction permit on file at the
time of enactment into law of this subsection, which permit would be for
issuance under section 103, and with respect to any application for an operating
license in connection with which a written request of an antitrust review is made
as provided for in paragraph (3), the Commission, after consultation with the
Attorney General, may, upon determination that such action is necessary in the
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Subpart 4 obligates the N.R.C. to turn over to the Department of
Justice relevant antitrust information to assit them in redering their
advice. Subpart 7 allows the N.R.C. and the Department of Justice to
collectively agree that an inconsistency alleged is so insignificant that
no action need be taken.
Subparts 5 and 6 have been the basis of all the litigation to date
regarding section 105. The following phrase has been particularly
troublesome: "whether the activities under the license would create or
maintain a situation ... inconsistent with the antitrust laws as specified
in subsection 105a." It has raised questions of the legal meaning of
"activity under the license," "situations inconsistent" as oppGsed to the
traditional violation standard, and "antitrust laws" which clearly refers
to the laws, and the policies underlying those laws. 53 The legislation has
also raised questions regarding the degree of nexus which must be
shown between the situation which has been alleged to be inconsistent
with the antitrust laws and the "activities under the license." 54
1.

"SituationsInconsistent with the Antitrust Laws"

The 1970 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act prohibit the
licensing of facilities where such licensing would create or maintain a
situation which is inconsistent with, though not necessarily in violation

public interest to avoid unnecessary delay, establish by rule or order periods for
Commission notification and receipt of advice differing from those set forth
above and may issue a construction permit or operating license in advance of
consideration of and findings with respect to the matters covered in this
subsection: Provided,that any construction permit or operating license so issued
shall contain such conditions as the Commission deems appropriate to assure
that any subsequent findings and orders of the Commission with respect to such
matters will be given full force and effect.
At the heart of 105(c), however, is subpart 5 and 6.
(5) Promptly upon receipt of the Attorney General's advice, the Commission shall publish the advice in the Federal Register. Where the Attorney
General advises that there may be adverse antitrust aspects and recommends
that there be a hearing, the Attorney General or his designee may participate as
a party in the proceedings thereafter held by the Commission on such licensing
matter in connection with the subject matter of his advice. The Commission shall
give due consideration to the advice received from the Attorney General and to
such evidence as may be provided during the proceedings in connection with
such subject matter, and shall make a finding as to whether the activities under
the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws as specified in subsection 105a.
(6) In the event the Commission's finding under paragraph (5) is in the
affirmative, the Commission shall also consider, in determining whether the
license should be issued or continued, such other factors, including the need for
power in the affected area, as the Commission in its judgment deems necessary
to protect the public interest. On the basis of its findings, the Commission shall
have the authority to issue or continue a license as applied for, to refuse to issue a
license, to rescind a license or amend it, and to issue a license with such
conditions as it deems appropriate." [Emphasis added.]
53. The question of policy underlying the laws is clarified in the legislative history.
54. See Commissioners Memoranda and Orderof O-t. 1, 1973 and Feb. 23, 1973, In
re Louisiana Power and Light, Waterford Units 50-382 A.
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of, the antitrust laws.5 5 In Northern PacificRailroadv. United States5 6
the Court redefined the scope of the Sherman Act:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a competitive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it
prohibits " . . . Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in

restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."
This is basic to the antitrust laws, and was recently reaffirmed in
United States v. Topco' Associates, Inc.57 There are then basic policies
which can be relied upon to determine "inconsistencies." Beyond those
policies, there is a very direct portion of the legislative history
regarding what constitutes an inconsistency:
Of course, the committee is intensely aware that around the subject
of prelicensing review and the provisions of subsection 105c., hover
opinions and emotions ranging from one extreme to the other pole. At
one extremity is the view that no prelicensing antitrust review is either
necessary or advisable and that the first two subsections of section 105
concerned with violation of the antitrust laws and the information
which the Commission is obliged to report to the Attorney General are
wholly adequate to deal with antitrust considerations. Additionally,
there are those who point out that it is unreasonable and unwise to
inflict on the construction or operation of nuclear powerplants and the
AFC licensing process any antitrust review mechanism that is not
required in connection with other types of generating facilities. At the
opposite pole is the view that the licensing process should be used not
only to nip in the bud any incipient antitrust situation but also to
further such competitive postures, outside of the ambit of the provisions
and established policies of the antitrust laws, as the Commission might
consider beneficial to the free enterprise system. The Joint Committee
does not favor, and the bill does not satisfy, either extreme view. 58
It was thus apparent that the Joint Committee understood exactly
the conflict between "violation" and inconsistency and the problems of
proof regarding the new procedure. Their decision heavily leans
toward Clayton Act insipiency and reasonable probability standards:
The legislation proposed by the committee provides for a finding
by the Commission "as to whether the activities under the license would
55. See S. REP. No. 1247, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
56. 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
57. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) stating:
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Charta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
58. Supra note 55, at 14.
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create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws as
specified in subsection 105a." The concept of certainty of contravention
of the antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying these laws is not
intended to be implicit in this standard; nor is mere possibility of
inconsistency. It is intended that the finding be based on reasonable
probability of contravention of the antitrust laws or the policies clearly
underlying these laws. It is intended that, in effect, the Commission
will conclude whether, in its judgment, it is reasonably probable that
the activities under the license would, when the license is issued or
thereafter, be inconsistent with any of the antitrust laws or the policies
clearly underlying these laws.
It is important to note that the antitrust laws within the ambit of
subsection 105c. of the bill are all the laws specified in subsection 105a.
These include the statutory provisions pertaining to the Federal Trade
Commission, which normally are not identified as antitrust law.
Accordingly, the focus for the Commission's finding will, for example,
include consideration of the admonition in section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, that "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair and deceptive acts in commerce, are
declared unlawful. 59
The Committee is well aware of the phrases "may be" and "tend to"
in the Clayton Act, and of the meaning they have been given by virtue
of decisions of the Supreme Court and the will of Congress-namely,
reasonable probability. The Committee has-very deliberately-also
chosen the touchstone of reasonable probability for the standard to be
considered by the Commission under the revised subsection 105 c. of the
bill.
The Committee did not deem it advisable to extend the boundaries
of the considerations to be taken into account by the Commission
beyond the antitrust laws and the policies clearly underlying these
laws. The situation is different in respect to AEC's developmental
regime; here Government funds are extensively devoted to the research
and development aspects of atomic energy and the Commission has the
duty not only to see to it that the funds are employed to best advantage
in relation to the specific statutory missions involved but to be mindful
of the general objective of strengthening free competition in private
enterprise. The absence of specific, guiding criteria toward this
objective, where the expense of the activity is borne by the Government,
does not amount to an intolerably gross and unfair inflication on
private enterprise of the convictions of a Federal agency, though these
may often be based on generally debatable philosophical principles.
Here, too, the committee, in its authorization process and in its
"watchdog" role, is in a position to react with respect to any particular
Commission measure relative to the objective of strenghtening free
competition in private enterprise which the committee may believe to
be insupportable or unwise; the committee could not so effectively react
in context of a licensing matter. The committee recognizes that there is
not a clear boundary between antitrust considerations in relation to the
strengthening of free competition in free enterprise and measures to
accomplish such objective for reasons other than the antitrust laws or
59.

Id.
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underlying antitrust policy; the Commission will have to exercise
discretion and judgment. 0
Inconsistency then, relates to the dictionary definition of "not in
agreement, harmony, or accord . . . not always holding to the same
principle or practice ... .61 Thus it is apparent that almost anything
under any of the antitrust laws which has been determined to be
unlawful in the past will suffice. To initiate prosecution, the Clayton
Act standard of reasonable probability is (or should be) used because of
its ready adaptability into the kind of market structures involved in the
wholesale bulk power area.
For example, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States62 allows for relief
when there is a tendency toward concentration, in its earliest-or
incipient-stage. Likewise, in the PhiladelphiaNational Bank Case63
the Court found that mere dominance and increased concentration by
an entity creates a situation in which competition is so likely to be
reduced that that concentration can be enjoined. The breadth of
Philadelphia National Bank is applicable to 105(c) cases. 64 Concentration when increased by the slightest quantum (e.g., 1.3% in ALCOA)65
has been found to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
All monopolization cases, all Sherman I and Sherman II cases,
where the challenge to activity, structure, or conduct has succeeded,
constitute reasonable standards for "inconsistencies with the antitrust
laws." Cases such as Otter Tail6 6 form particularly relevant examples of
"inconsistences" since Otter Tail involves an electric utilities refusal to
deal, a common allegation in N.R.C. proceedings. Likewise, refusals to
wheel (transmission of wholesale bulk power over third party systems
by a party who is neither a buyer nor seller of the power), refusals to sell
unit power, and general refusals to participate in coordinated planning
and development or in coordinated operation are classic electric utility
"inconsistencies with the antitrust laws. 6 7 It should be noted that
under a statute as broad as section 105(c) these inconsistencies may be
derived from any antitrust law, and may relate to injury to competition
and competitors. 6 The law is further clear that an "inconsistency" may
be established by combining a series of acts, which taken individually
9
are lawful, but as a group constitute an injury to competition.6
Equally relevant is the question of dominance by a single utility,
which is lawful, but which then is combined with the most minor
60. Id.
61. WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 712 (2d ed.)
62. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
63. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
64. See, e.g., A.D. NEAL, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 442 (1968).
65. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
66. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
67. Id.; N.R.C. Doc. 75/061, Coordination, Competition and Regulation in the
Electric Untility Industry (1975).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2135 (a) and (c).
69. See United States v. IBM, CCH (1975), Trd. Cs. 60, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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conduct to create an exclusion. Such activity is "inconsistent" with the
antitrust laws and must be read into section 105 as prohibited conduct.
The classic opinion of Judge Hand in ALCOA is fully descriptive:
This increase and this continued and undisturbed control did not fall
undesigned into "Alcoa's" lap; obviously it could not have done so. It
could only have resulted, as it did result, from a persistent determination to maintain the control, with which it found itself vested in
1912. There were at least one or two abortive attempts to enter the
industry, but "Alcoa" effectively anticipated and forestalled all competition, and succeeded in holding the field alone.... We need charge it
with no moral derelictions after 1912; we may assume that all it claims
for itself is true. The only question is whether it falls within the
exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot
avoid, the control of a market. It seems to us that that question scarcely
survives its statement. It was not inevitable that it should always
anticipate increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply
them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its
capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded

competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than

progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face
every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections
and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret "exclusion" as
limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial,but actuated solely by a
desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued,
be deemed not "exclusionary." So to limit it would in our judgment

emasculate the Act; would permit just consolidations as it was designed
to prevent. 0 [Emphasis added.]

Likewise, Judge Wyzanski established for monopolization, andfor §

105 cases, the highly unnecessary nature of extensive proof of intent:
So far, nothing in this opinion has been said of defendant's intent in
regard to its power and practices in the shoe machinery market. This

point can be readily disposed of by reference once more to Aluminum,
148 F.2d at pages 431-432. Defendant intended to engage in the leasing

practices and pricing policies which maintained its market power.
That is all the intent which the law requires when both the complaint
and the judgment rest on a charge of "monopolizing," not merely
"attempting to monopolize." Defendant having willed the means, has
willed the end.7 [Emphasis added.]
Beyond monopoly related offenses, situations inconsistent with the
antitrust laws can include refusals to deal, as in Eastman Kodak v.
Southern Photo Materials.72 In that case Kodak had achieved dominance in the wholesale film development exchange market, and was left
with only one competitor (Southern) in the relevant geographic area.
70. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430-31 (2d Cir.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 110 F. Supp.
295,346 (D. Mass.
1953). 72. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
1945). 71.
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The refusal to deal at wholesale rates with the competitor was
inconsistent with the antitrust laws, much the same as a dominant
services can
utility's refusal to coordinate in various generation
73
constitute an inconsistency with the antitrust laws.
Among the most apparent "inconsistencies" is the so-called "bottleneck" cases. These situations involve the refusal by an entity which
controls a scarce or unique resource to allow a competitor's participation in that resource. It is particularly relevant with regard to a
nuclear power plant because nuclear energy generation is invariably a
scarce resource and must be interconnected with a high voltage
transmission network, which is equally unique. These items have
become scarce because of general regulations prohibiting unnecessary
unit duplication, environmental considerations, and the unit power cost
phenomenon, which effectively excludes all but the largest 7 4private
investor owned utilities from participation in nuclear power.
A classic bottleneck case which parallels a nuclear unit "refusal to
75
deal" situation is United States v. Terminal Railroad Association.
Terminal Railroad is one of the earliest cases that deals with a single
firm exclusion by indirection, e.g., a blanket refusal to participate with
any party regarding a controlling entity's scarce resources. 76 There,
refusal by an association to allow competing entities access to a bridge
and ferry system created a service "bottleneck" and required the court
to remedy the situation. That situation was quite similar to a situation
where a nuclear power applicant dominates high voltage transmission,
needed for the plant and for system wide operation. The applicant who
denies access to this system (which cannot be duplicated) has involved
itself in a Terminal Railroad inconsistency.
It should be noted that creating a "bottleneck" or refusing to deal is
an inconsistency despite the fact that it can be the result of single firm
activity, as opposed to conspiratorial conduct.7
7s

7

In Gamco, Inc. v.

ProvidenceFruit& Produce,Inc., a single firm's refusal to grant access
to a unique resource to a competitor constituted the basis for a finding
against the firm. Gamco was another case which closely parallels
situations in the electric utility industry where an operator of a facility
will refuse to grant lesser entities access to it, and thereby effectively79
precludes surrounding firms from the nuclear power supply option.
73. See Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc., 255 F.2d 708
(3d Cir. 1958).
74. Supra note 67.
75. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
76. It should be noted that Terminal R.R. and its progeny no longer required a
concerted refusal to one party; if there is sufficient reason to believe that the transaction
will be refused, no refusal need in fact occur.
77. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v.
Beech Meat Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
78. 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
79. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941), for situations where refusals to deal or single firm denials have been
found to be inconsistent with antitrust laws.
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Otter Tail80 is the most recent extrapolation of "bottleneck" in the
antitrust field, and certainly serves as a basis for numerous "inconsistencies.""1
2.

"Meaningful Nexus"

The primary inquiry under section 105 is whether the activities
under the license create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the
antitrust laws. The "situation" can be almost any facts or circumstances
that the applicant is involved in which are arguably unlawful, or
"inconsistent." However, it is quite untrue that all inconsistencies are
within the ambit of agency review. 82 There is a jurisdictional
requirement,83 or "nexus," which seeks to insure that only those
situations which are legitimately connected to activities under the
license will come under agency review.
There is a dual standard utilized in the evaluation of the nexus, one
part relating to the factual connection and a second tier analysis going
to the legal requirements of nexus. Very simply, the licensed activity
must create or maintain the "situation" alleged to be inconsistent with
the antitrust laws. For example, where a facility applicant has
monopolized the bulk power supply and controls high voltage transmission, the addition of the nuclear power will add to that monopoly and
control. Any denial of access to bulk power or refusal to deal on the
transmission system would subject the applicant to review because the
facility will aid in maintaining existing dominance. Factually, nexus
would also be satisfied. Clearly, any "situations" which are unaffected
84
by or unrelated to any licensed activity are outside the scope of review.
In the In the matter of LouisianaPower and Light Co. decision, the
Atomic Energy Commission recognized the necessity of "a meaningful
nexus [being] ... established between the situation and the 'activities
under the license.' "85 The Atomic Energy Commission noted that this
meant the agency was empowered to review all situations which could
be shown to be reasonably related to the licensed facility, but not the
entire system of the applicant. The mere fact that nuclear power "will
be comingled [sic] with the power from other . .. generating facilities"
will not be enough to show nexus.8 6 The physical relationship of the

80. Supra note 66.
81. See Klors v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), for an example of
unlawful group boycott, which could apply under § 105.
82. Supra note 54.
83. It should be noted that Consumers considers nexus in a substantive light, and is
inconsistent with the following materials, since it has become apparent that the question
of nexus is procedural, i.e., it should be resolved prior to a hearing on the substantive
merits.
84. The requirement of pleading and proving a meaningful nexus has been
contested in every litigated case since 1973, thus defeating any simplistic approach.
85. Memorandumand Orderof Feb. 23, 1973 and Memorandumand Orderof Sept.
28, 1973, 50-382 A., In re Louisiana Power and Light Co., Waterford, Unit 3 (1973).
86. Id. Decision of February 23, 1973 at 6.
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applicant's generation system can be evaluated vis-A-vis the proposed
facility to determine the nature of the connection.
It is apparent that power generated from a nuclear facility will
enable an applicant to increase system generating capacity, reserves,
bulk power sales, overall firm power reliability, capacity and energy
87
available for sale to others, and the firm-non-firm power ratio.
Likewise, an efficient nuclear unit will decrease fossil fuel costs, reduce
environmental compliance costs, and reduce operating and spinning
reserve requirements. 88
These assets can be quantified, and can involve the entire system of
the applicant. They become open for review to determine whether: (1)
the alleged situational inconsistency relates to one of these assets, and
(2) these assets are in fact enhanced, maintained and/or created, by the
addition of the unit.8 9 The legal problems with "nexus" have become
increasingly complex, however, since no major applicant can operate in
isolation, 90 many of the benefits mentioned flow directly to other utilities
which are interconnected, thus complicating the nexus question. Subtle
inconsistencies, for example, a refusal to invite smaller utilities to
participate in coordinated planning, are difficult to connect to "activities under the license" when nexus is narrowly construed. Thus, the
legal meaning of nexus must be established: the term "nexus" refers to
a "connection, tie, or link ... ."91 In the legal sense, nexus problems
invariably refer to the degree or extent of a connection, rather than the
physical existence of a relationship. Within the last fifty years, courts
have turned away from the concept of physical connection and physical
presence looking rather to the impact or effect of a connection.92
In Municipal Electric Association v. Securities Exchange Commission, the district court was petitioned to evaluate an order of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission which approved the joint
acquisition of stock in two nuclear power plants.93 The petitioners had
alleged that the stock acquisition would lead to exaggerated concentration in the bulk power exchange market, and would effectively
preclude the municipal systems from competing. No direct violation of
the antitrust laws was alleged, but rather, it was argued that the
conduct involved (i.e., increased private investor owned utility genera87. See generaUy, PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 537-94 (1969);
Coordination,Competition,and Regulation in the Electric Power Industry, supra,note 67.
88. Id.
89. So as not to lose perspective, the Consumers decisions utilizes a framework not
unlike this one, but requires positive proof of the inconsistency (which the Board calls
"unsure") rather than mere allegation of the inconsistency.
90.
91.

1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY Ch. 2 (1970) (F.P.C. 1970) at 1-4.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra
note 60.

92. Cf. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); compare Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714 (1877); for
"nexus", as a general term which is satisfied by even indirect effect; see, American
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. State Tax Comm., 238 Ore. 340, 395 P.2d 127 (1964).
93. 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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tional dominance) was sufficiently connected to the governmental action
(i.e., approval of the merger-acquisition plan) to allow full review of the
conduct. Naturally, the municipalities saw a foreclosure of coordinated
developmental possibilities, and an attempt to prevent it.
The court found that since it was reasonably probable that the
sponsors of the unit were "obtaining a monopoly . . . over electric
generation through systematic exclusion of municipals and other small
electric distributors from participating in or purchase of power from
nuclear generators in New England 91 there was a sufficiently pleaded
"situation."
Next, they sought to determine if this situation was
sufficiently connected to the activities (i.e., approval of the stock
acquisition). The court considered, as factors of nexus, the interconnection of the plant with the New England Power Grid, prior denial
of low cost or wholesale-for-resale bulk power to smaller entities,
regional power exchange history, and patterns of increased concentration. Such criteria are suitable in a section 105 proceeding. Simple
95
exclusion from a "coordinating council" alone may be sufficient.
Likewise, discriminatory interchange agreements 96 and general
refusal of coordination in wheeling services,9 7 are situations already
found to be "tied" to all generation points on a system, for purposes of
antitrust review. Each instance of agency evaluation of nexus creates
the necessity of new assessment regarding "connection" or relationship.
As the district court stated in Gulf States Utilities v. Federal Power
Commission: "the requirement of reasonable nexus.., is fairly implied
in the jurisprudence. Development of the requirement must await
consideration in the first instance by the agency involved, and on
98
analysis of the factual context.
The "factual" contexts mentioned above are generally not as
problematic as the legal definitions of nexus which are established in
almost every case. One aspect which is particularly difficult to
comprehend is the supposed interplay which exists between the nexus
concept and the spurious "immunity based on regulated status"
argument mentioned earlier.9 9 The difficulty lies in the prior immunity
which was afforded to utilities regarding certain monopolistic practices, e.g., territorial allocation, competitor conference rights and the
like.100 These islands of immunity fall by the wayside in two respects
94.

Id. at 1059.

95. See Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. F.P.C., 414 F.2d 1206 (D.C. 1969).
96. Gainsville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971).
97. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 355 (1973).
98. City of Lafayette v. F.P.C., 454 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971). affd sub
nom. Gulf States Util. Co. v. F.P.C., 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
99. It is patently incorrect to declare, as does the Board in Consumers, that
activities which are "otherwise regulated" are not sufficiently connected (nexus factor)
and thus immune. See discussion of nexus, as deliniated by the Board, infra; see also,
F.P.C. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
100. Pennsylvania Water and Power Co. v. Consolidated G.E.L. & P. Co., 184 F.2d
552 (4th Cir. 1950, appealed 194 F.2d 89, cert. denied 343 U.S. 963 (1952).
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when a utility applies for a license to operate a power plant.10' First,
courts have mandated antitrust review in similar situations. 102 Second,
the legislature, in directing the Atomic Energy Commission to grant
licenses to private entities for utilization of nuclear power, made very
specific its desire not to have these licenses facilitate the advancement of
previously sanctioned monopolistic endeavors. The Joint Committee
Report on Atomic Energy of the 91st Congress 0 3 includes statements by
Senator Hart, stating:
Under no circumstances would the Commission be relieved of its
responsibility to require applicants for licenses to conform to the
antitrust provisions . . . and the antitrust laws generally ...
It would be a distressing development if nuclear power were allowed to
grow-but brought with it monopolistic practices which had the effect
of limiting the supply of power to some energy companies .... 104
The Atomic Energy Commission has seen fit to seek to enforce these
laws. In the most recent decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
10 5
Appeals Board (the body which will hear the appeal in Consumers),
the Atomic Energy Commission indicated an unwillingness to back step
on the nexus-immunity question. In the Wolf Creek0 6 decision, the
Board found that the applicant (Kansas Gas and Electric) had
improperly placed its focus on "activities under the license" to
determine nexus, and had focused on the plant and activities physically
tied to the plant. 07 The Board found that review can extend to all
situations where there is a reasonable probability that the situation will
be maintained or enhanced by the granting of the license.
Accordingly, we [the Board] conclude that the legislative history of
Section 105(c) does not support the applicant's argument that the
Commission must consider the operations of each nuclear plant in
isolation when making its prelicensing antitrust review. On the
contrary, the Commission's statutory obligation is to weigh the
anticompetitive situation-which to us means that operations in any
'airtightchamber' were not intended.... It was a key purpose of the
prelicense review to ' . . . nip in the bud any incipient antitrust
situation.' We can therefore perceive no valid reason why the Commis-

101.

infra.

This is so despite the misconstruction of the nexus requirement in Consumers,

102. Supra note 66, and see Gulf States Util. v. F.P.C., 411 U.S. at 769 et. seq.;
City of Pittsburgh v. F.P.C., 327 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Cf. Volkswagenwerk v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
103. S. REP. No. 1247, 91st Cong., supra note 54.
104. 116 CONG. REC. 39622 (1970).
105. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.785 (1970).
106. Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Kansas City Power and Light
Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1) No. 50-4820 A, Decision of Atomic
Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, 19-20 (June 30, 1975).
107. Id. Memorandum Opinion, at 7.
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sion should wear blinders when confronted by such matters. No statute
should be construed to render it ineffective ....

The words of the statute upon which the applicant relies direct the
Commission to consider not only whether granting a license would
"create" an anticompetitive situation but also whether it would
"maintain" one. Thus, to the extent the applicant's argument suggests
that the Commission's cognizance under Section 105c is limited to
anticompetitive consequences directly attributable to applicant'suse of
the nuclear power plant and its output, it makes no sense. As the staff
points out, for activities under a license to "maintain"a pre-existing
situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, some conduct of the
applicant apartfrom its license activities must have been the "cause"for
bringing about those anticompetitive conditions. Nothing in Section
105c suggests that Congress wanted the Commission to focus on an
applicant's extra-license conduct when determining whether an anticompetitive situation would be "maintained," but to close its eyes to that
conduct in deciding whether such a situation would be "created."
Indeed, were we to accept the dichotomy inherent in the applicant's
position, we would be at a loss to perceive how a licensing board should
proceed when it is alleged - as it is in this case - that granting a
construction permit would both create and maintain an anticompetitive situation. There is, of course, a settled presumption against
imputing to Congress an intent to achieve an irrational result. We are
particularly disinclined to go against that presumption where another,
more sensible reading of the provision in question is suggested by its
legislative history. 08 [Emphasis added.]
Thus, nexus should not serve as a bar to review of coordination
patterns, regional generation systems with which the applicant is
interconnected, or general transmission networks where service of any
kind has been denied. Naturally, such review will "extend only to
anticompetitive situations intertwined with or exacerbated by the
10 9
award of a license to construct or operate a nuclear facility.'
Wheeling denials on the transmission system of the applicant over high
voltage lines not integrally related to the proposed facility are to be
included in the review, if the above condition of exacerbation or
enhancement is met. In denying the request of the applicant to "wear
blinders" and "operate in an airtight chamber," the Wolf Creek Board
went beyond the Waterford" ° decision in delineating a broad review
potential, rather than structuring a system where items would be
eliminated from review because of the absence of a "physical interface."
It should be noted that Wolf Creek deals with the alleged denial of
access to supplemental power arrangements, not direct access to a unit
or to transmission service.11' Since supplemental power (a form of nonfirm standby power needed to allow for wholesale transactions, not to be
108.
109.

Wolf Creek, supra note 106 at 19-23.
Id.

111.

Supra note 105, at 1-10.

110.

Waterford Units, Louisiana Power and Light Co., supra note 84.
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confused with spinning or operating reserves)11 2 is by physical definition several steps removed from direct generation and transmission,
Wolf Creek takes on even greater significance in the. nexus debate.
It would seem, after Wolf Creek, that micro-economics will play an
equal role in the nexus assessment process. A review of the "integrated
system" of the applicant'1 3 (that being the thrust of Wolf Creek),
requires a multilevel inquiry via a traditional market analysis, i.e., who
are the buyers and sellers of wholesale power, unit power, wholesale for
resale power, firm, non-firm, and bulk power? What transmission
services have been offered or refused? What is the production or
differentiation, the nature of the organizational diversity? What are the
barriers to entry and have they been or will they be modified by the
unit? What cost structures have become evident, and what are the
competitive consequences thereof?
What degree of vertical and
horizontal
integration
is
extant,
and
what
degree of conglomerateness
exists?1 1 4
Such inquiries will result in a structural assessment of an
applicants system, as opposed to a conduct-intent related inquiry.
Additionally, they will lead to formulations of contentions which are
easily approached in an administrative antitrust hearing. The following issues were derived from several draft contentions which were used
(though in different form) in the Consumers case: 11 5
1.

a. Whether applicant alone or together with others has
the ability to hinder or prevent:
(1) smaller electric entities from achieving access to
the benefits of coordinated operation (reserve sharing, emergency power exchanges, deficiency power
sales and other coordination of existing facilities)
either among themselves or with applicant or other
electric utilities;
(2) smaller electric entities from achieving access to
the benefits of economy of size of large electric
generating units by coordinated development (joint
planning and investment, staggered investment
and joint investment in new plants to achieve
economies of scale) either among themselves or
with applicant or other electric utilties.
b. Whether a situation or situations inconsistent with the
antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying these
laws has resulted or will result from the exercise of
such ability.

112. See F.P.C. Glossary of Terms, prepared by the Interagency Committee on
Water Resources, (1965).
113. See Foreign League Study v. C.A.B., 1973 Trd. Cases (10th Cir. 1973).
114. F. SCHERE, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
5-16 (1971).
115. The final contentions for Consumers are available at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., N.R.C. Pub. Doc. Room: 50-329A, 50-330A, filed August 7, 1972. The
outline which follows is taken, in substantial part, from those contentions.
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2.

Whether applicant's policy not to sell unit power or ownership shares in the nuclear facility being licensed deprives
smaller electric utilities that are connected or could be
connected with applicant, of the benefit of power from the
licensed facility and thereby results in a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying these laws.
B. The nexus question then becomes what is the relationship
between the proposed facility and the applicant's system?
1. The addition of the nuclear facility does not exist in isolation;
the power is more than commingled with other power on the
system. For example, the plant enables the system to
increase:
a. system generating capacity,
b. system generating reserves,
c. system reliability,
d. capacity and energy available for sale to the applicant's customers,
e. capacity and energy available for sale to other facilities,
f. capacity and energy available for emergency support to
other electrical systems,
g. energy available for pumping at pumped storage hydro
plants
(1) enables the nuclear facility to be utilized on a full
time basis which makes the most economical use of
the facility
(2) removes necessity of new coal-fired generation.
2. In addition, the nuclear facility reduces the need for certain
very costly additions for the system:
a. the need to build fossil-fired steam generating units,
gas turbines and internal combustion generating units,
b. the amount of oil, coal and natural gas required,
c. particulate and sulfur dioxide emissions,
d. noise pollution.
3. The nuclear plant also causes functional changes to take
place by modifying:
a. generation scheduling and dispatch,
b. interconnection flows,
c. stability limits,
d. system frequency response,
e. spinning and operating reserves requirements.
4. Physical connections to the system must also exist before
the functional changes can take place:
a. connection to the transmission grid and to
b. load centers
c. other generating units
d. the pumped storage hydro plant
e. spinning and operating reserves requirements.
Thus, it would seem that the nexus requirement will be
eventually a question of systemic evaluation, followed by a pleading
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The ultimate

question for nexus will or should be:
Are the situations, if taken as true,. in any way related to that portion of
the applicant's systemic production-distribution program which is
involved with the proposed nuclear unit?
3.

"Activities Under the License"

The process of licensing review does not focus exclusively on the
specific conduct or activity which is licensed. Subparts one and two
supra indicate that a review must be made of situations which are
connected to "activities under a license." Few successful attorneys in
the area of administrative antitrust can avoid the necessity of learning
about the technology of the area in which they practice. In nuclear
energy, there are no "basic primers" in thermo-dynamic nuclear physics
or in the economics of high voltage transmission. The most one can do is
get a feeling for the vocabulary and trends in an industry and then grow
into the sophisticated technological nuances of nuclear power.
Legally, the phrase "activities under the license" has come to16be used
It is
to describe the relevant geographic and product markets.
perhaps wise to make such an analogy, since the systemic integration of
nuclear power within the interconnected grid of an applicant is the rule,
not the exception. 117 In legal terms, the relevant market of a nuclear
unit is no different than the product market for any other industry. In
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States' 18 the Supreme Court found that a
geographic market must "correspond to the commercial realities of the
industry and must be economically significant."' 9 There are six regions
in the United States which form one basis for geographic determination
of relevant market for regional power and service exchanges. 120 There
are thirteen major power pools, which are privately established2
coordinating groups which can also form the basis for market area.' '
Within these regions, all private utilities, municipalities, rural
electrical cooperatives, public utilities, or other bulk power purchasers
(generally industrial users) operate in a theoretically coordinated
manner. Today, no one major region operates in isolation.
Courts have sought to confine relevant markets 22 to "the area of
effective competition in the known line of commerce ... [where] the
seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for
116. "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," Consumers Power,
Midland Units, 50-329A, filed by N.R.C. Regulatory Staff, October 8, 1974 at 29-40.

117. W. STUART NELSON, MID CONTINENT AREA POWER PLANNERS:
APPROACH IN PLANNING IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1968).
118.
119.

120.
121.

A

NEW

370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Id. at 366.
1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, F.P.C. (1967).

1 PREVENTION

OF POWER FAILURES

36, F.P.C. (1967).

122: For N.R.C. discussion of relevant markets, see In re Cleviand Electric
Illuminating Co., Davis Besse Facility, 50-346A, N.P.C. 1974 et. seq.
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Frequently state
supplies and services.''23 [Emphasis supplied.]
franchise laws124 and the high cost of new high voltage transmission
facilities (including the necessary incorporeal hereditaments) will form
natural market limitations. Thus, a third term, "service area," is
25
frequently used in describing the total activities of a single entity.'
However, "physical activity" is too confining when broad competitive
implications are involved.' 26 It is logical in section 105(c) cases to extend
competition, and areas in which service
the market to areas of actual
127
can be feasibly extended.
Further, the law will often extend a market to areas where there is a
"reasonable interchangeability of use of cross-elasticity of demand by
the product itself and substitutes for it .... ,"128 In addition, the market
or "activity under the license" in the overwhelming majority of cases
will include diverse receptor areas, i.e., areas where wholly different
services or products are involved, all of which emanate from or are
related to the nuclear unit.
involved.
In addition, it is necessary to look at the specific products
29
The basic "products" for this analysis are listed below:'
a.

b.

c.

Sales of bulk power or energy at wholesale for resale: Bulk power
is comprised of firm power "where the seller stands ready at all
times to have available and deliver the firm power capacity in
kilowatts specified in the contract,"' 30 and non-firm power. Nonfirm power is power sold in bulk to industries or utilities which
do not require a continuous flow or have sufficient storage or
self generation facilities to offset a power loss.
Sale of Surplus Economy Energy: Energy produced at (i) lower
than normal system wide cost and thus sold as unit power (the
cost per unit of power generated at the particular utility) and
(ii) a rate of generation which is unpredictable or not firm. This
energy is normally sold above and beyond all contracts, and can
be highly profitable for a system which has better than average
generating capacity and substantial numbers of industrial
customers.
Dump Energy Sale: Energy produced above all contracts,
predictions, and surplus, which will go to waste if purchasers
are not found shortly. This is the least expensive of the non-firm

123. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1962).
124. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.13 et. seq. (1970).
125. Glossary, Edison Electric Institute Pub., 70-40, at 72 (1970).
126. PHILLIPS, supra note 87, at Chapter 15.
127. Supra note 116, at 30. (Brief of N.R.C. Staff).
128. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 n.122 (1962).
129. The following materials are complex, but vital to understanding the competitive structure. For a detailed description of the products, see the Edison Electric
Institute Work, supra note 125.
130. GLOSSARY OF ELECTRIC TERMS AND COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY, Edison Electric Institute at 27 (1947).
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power, and is usually sold by large private investor-owned
entities or by any utility which experiences excess generation.
Emergency, Breakdown, and Standby Power Sales: This is power
which a generator agrees will be available to supply all or part
of the requirements of another in emergency situations. It is
paid for whether used or not, and is not to be confused with
reserve power.
Reserve Power Exchanges: A nuclear unit, because of the
relatively modern technology involved, does not usually enhance
a major private investor utility systems supply of bulk-firm
power. It has massive impact on reserve power, however, since
the Federal Power Commission reliability quotient for establishing reserves does not require constant power flows. 132 This is
important to keep in mind, since systems which are denied
reserve sharing with nuclear participants are denied a substantial benefit of atomic energy. 133 While a reserve ratio is
always system wide for any given utility, it can be calculated by
establishing the size of the largest unit on the system, and projecting the consequences which would result if that unit were
inoperable. 134 Smaller systems which are effectively prohibited
from ownership participation in nuclear power 3 5 require
reserve sharing with nuclear powered systems to compete
effectively. Reserve is best described as follows:

The power plants must have reserve or standby capacity to enable
the system to carry the load in case of failure of any one unit. As a
practical matter, the reserve capacity must be at least equal to the
capacity of the largest unit serving the system because this unit might
fail. If the reserve unit is in operation (i.e. spinning at full speed) it is
called a spinning reserve. A machine so operating can take load almost
instantaneously. Such a spinning reserve is taking steam and therefore
fuel only in amounts sufficient to overcome such losses as are caused
by friction. Such a machine can be spinning at full speed and yet be
carrying no load. At times a boiler is kept hot in readiness to operate a
turbine whereas the turbine may not be spinning. This is called a hot
reserve. A turbo-generator, or power plant, that is kept as reserve with
no heat under the boiler and not in operation is called a cold reserve. It
may take an hour or more to bring the machine from a cold reserve
to a
136
spinning reserve, or to a condition where it can carry load.
f.

Transmission Services, Including Wheeling:
Transmission of wholesale or bulk power by a dominant entity
which controls high voltage transmission is a critical factor in

131. Excess generation is most common with hydro-electric systems, when power
supply and cost ratios may parallel the weather cycle.
132. See generally, 1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 1-30 (1970).
133. 1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY (1970).
134. There are numerous other formulas for computation of the reserve requirement, supra note 120.
135. The Nuclear Industry in 1973, Wash. 1144-73 at 5 (1974).
136. Supra note 130 at 14.
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assuring organizational diversity and competition. Denial of
transmission, which is as vital to a nuclear unit as it is to
competing systems, is denial of the essential coordinating
medium, and is a refusal to deal in a classical sense. Transmission is the theoretical transfer of an assigned quantum of
energy from one point on an interconnected system to a second
point. "Transmission line capacity [is] the maximum continuous rating of a transmission line. The ratings may be
limited by thermal considerations, capacity of associated equipment, voltage regulation, system stability or other factors.
Transmission system [is] an interconnected group of electric
transmission lines and associated equipment for the movement
or transfer of electric energy in bulk. .". ."I" Wheeling occurs
when one utility generates power which is transmitted (wheeled)
by a second utility to and for the benefit of a third utility.13s
g. Coordinated Operation is the general term used to describe
the operating and transmission systems of two or more distinct
entities on a cooperative basis, either as a single line system, or
as individual participants. A failure to allow access to a nuclear
unit by ownership (if stock is available), by unit power
purchases (power purchased with the cost based on only the
nuclear unit), or denials to participate in requested transmission or reserve arrangements is a denial of coordinated
139
operation.
h. Coordinated Planning refers to cooperative projection of load
growth, demand, service needs, generation capacity and the like
done by more than one entity. Coordinating councils are
established for this purpose, or power pools. Exclusion by a
nuclear participant of another entity in the given geographic
market which assists the participant in maintaining a posture of
dominance or preserving a tightly knit oligopoly is an inconsis140
tency with section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act.
The above services or operations form the product market, and
should be considered "activities under the license." Grouping of all bulk
power services within the "product market" simplifies the task of the
adjudicatory body14' in its search to connect allegedly inconsistent
situations with the activities being licensed. This position is also
137.
(1965).
138.
139.

Glossary, F.P.C., Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources Edition at 21
See, e.g., United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
See, PHILLIPS, supra note 87; "Findings of Fact", supra note 115; and

Coordination,Competition and Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry, supra note 67

at 28-41.
140. Supra note 14. [Note: This position is the conclusion of the N.R.C. Staff, but has
not been supported or condemned by any legislative or adjudicative body.]

141. N.R.C. Staff and applicants seem to agree that the resultant product market,
as it relates to "activities under the license" is broad. Consumer Power Co., Midland
Units, 50-329A, 50-330A, Prepared Testimony of Dr. Joseph Pace, N.E.P.A., (for the
applicants) at 31-34; Applicants Pre-TrialBrief, at 105-106.
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supported by the Federal Power Commission's National Power Survey
in 1970.142
In the Consumers case, the Department of Justice viewed activities
under the license as the "integration of... megawatts of nuclear power
into [an] Applicant's system for marketing. .. ,,m The Department took
into account alternative fuel sources in projecting that nuclear generated power will be low in unit cost. Accordingly, the Department stated
that "the advantage of integrating low cost nuclear generation into a
multiple plant, multiple fuel, electric utility operation is obvious.
Average cost is reduced. To the extent that the applicant is able to
reduce its average cost while preventing its competitors from doing so,
improves its competitive position.' ' 144 The Department of Justice went
on to note that by combining the non-firm nuclear generator power with
other firm and non-firm power which runs through the applicant's high
voltage transmission system, firm power is in effect "created". If the
system of the applicant was one in "isolation", i.e., not interconnected,
only fifty percent of the unit power of the nuclear facility could be
marketed as firm. 145 Therefore, the interconnection system with other
utilities, and the entire transmission network of an applicant could fall
within the review powers of a section 105 hearing and be considered
"activities under the license."
V. MAJOR STRUCTURAL INDUSTRY TRENDS
A.

Nuclear Generated Power Market Structure

The nuclear power-electric generation industry is one of the most
sophisticated of all our industries because decision making by involved
generating entities must take into account domestic economic policy, 14 6
domestic environmental policies,' 47 foreign policy vis-a-vis energy
product and nuclear power, 48 not to mention investor reaction, market
149
fluctuations,
long range government spending and public senti0
ment. 15

142. See generally, 1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 2-23 (1970).
143. Department of Justice, Prehearing Brief, Consumers Power Co., Midland
Units, 50-329A; 50330A, filed Nov. 20, 1973 at 66.
144. Id. at 69.
145. Id.
146.

See STEVEN LUSTGARTEN, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND INFLATION, (A.

E.P., Wash., D.C. 1975).
147. See, e.g., 1 & 2 Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power, Hearings
Before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 1109-1787, (1971).
148. See, e.g., Foreign Policy Implications of the Energy Crisis, Hearings Before
Subcommittee on Foreion Economic Policy, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 21-25, 1972 1-455; (1972).
149. See Consumers Power Co., 50-329A; 50-330A, LBP-75-39, July 1975 at 64,
dealing with the net profits analysis.
150. CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Aug. 8, 1973, at 16; CHICAGO SUN TIMES, July 23, 1973, at
18; CHICAGO SUN TIMES, June 26, 1973 at 15.
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In the last decade, there has been tremendous pressure on all
utilities to consolidate in an effort to maximize the economies of scale
which exist in the industry.' 5' This is true for the entire electric utility
industry, and not only for nuclear power operators. There are
approximately 3,500 "systems" in the United States, though over 2,000
are relatively small distribution systems, i.e., systems which are not
involved in generation or wholesale bulk power sales. 152 In generation,
there are 200 firms controlling 75-80% of all generation, and of these
almost all are horizontally integrated via power pool arrangements
15 3
with other major generators or by means of holding companies.
One distressing industry trend has been the tendency of the giant
private investor owned systems [hereinafter P.I.O.S.] to coordinate with
contiguous P.I.O.S., leaving "several smaller private cooperative and
municipal systems existing as islands within the larger system's sphere
of operation... .,154 The consequences of such isolation, when combined
with P.I.O.S. refusals to wheel is deadly: the smaller system, unable to
coordinate generation and transmission with other non-contiguous
systems and unable to build new generation due to scale economics, is
forced to sell out, die out and be overtaken, or purchase wholesale power
from the P.I.O.S. at almost retail cost. 155 The result is a tendency
toward a cessation of organizational diversity and a loss of yardstick
competition. 56 Sixty percent of all power generated is by a pool
arrangement.
Financial benefits are often realized from staggered construction of
large generating units, short term capacity transaction, and exchanges
of economy energy. Reduction of installed reserve capacity is made
possible by mutual emergency assistance arrangements and associated
coordinated transmission planning. Bulk power supply reliability is
enhanced by interconnection agreements covering spinning reserves,
reactive kilovolt-ampere requirements, emergency service, coordination7 of day to day service and coordination of maintenance schedules.
As new technology produced larger units, hope of smaller systems
becoming fully independent owners of nuclear power generation
virtually vanished. 158 Without intersystem coordination, the smaller
systems are excluded from nuclear power and theoretically condemned
to extinction. 159 This exclusion was felt to be of such magnitude that it

151. Meeks, Concentrationin the Electric Power Industry, The Impact of Antitrust
Policy, 72 COL. L. REV. 69 (1972).

152.
153.

1 NATIONAL
Id. at 2-4.

154.

Supra note 149, at 69.

155.

1

156.
157.
158.
159.

Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note

POWER SURVEY,

NATIONAL POWER SURVEY,

151.
155, at 1-17-1.
155, at 1-17-27.
155, at 1-17-28.

F.P.C. Ch. 2 (1970).
F.P.C. at 1-17-2 (1970).
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was a primary impetus for the passage of the Section 105 amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act in 1970.160
While coordination may seem to create antitrust problems, e.g.,
price discussion through combinations of competitors, it appears that
exactly the opposite is the case. It is only through coordination that a
mix, or variety in participants in the electric utility industry can be
sustained.1 6' The 1964 National Power Survey details the various
factors of organizational diversity, finding general "benefits of the
existing pluralistic institutional structure if all segments of the
industry, and all the individual systems within each segment, would
realize that their ideological differences are no bar to working together
in establishing stronger regional and interregional power pools....
What is required is a good faith effort by all segments of the industry to
coordinate their efforts for mutual benefit. 162 Six years later, the 1970
National Power Survey came to the same conclusion:
The electric utility industry can achieve full coordination, without
altering its pluralistic character, by coordinating the planning,
construction, and operating activities of all utility groups in areas with
loads of sufficient size to realize all the potential benefits of modern
technology, and by strengthening generation and transmission facilities as necessary for assuring adequacy and reliability of power
supply. Certainly, from both the resource conservation and economy of
service viewpoints, coordination among all of the
utilities within the
respective regions should be a major objective. 63
That the utility industry is at a point of great technological change is
a historical fact. With the unsuitability of fossil fuels, power supply
options, including nuclear, have become essential to all participants in
the utility industry. 6 4 This is particularly true since the sites were
hydro-electric power can be generated are, for the most part, in full use.
Furthermore fossil fuel plant fuel cost and air quality problems relating
to fossil fuel render these plants impracticable. Finally the present cost
165
per thermal unit of nuclear fuels is lower than that of fossil fuels.
Nuclear units, capable of generating over 3000 megawatts (MW) are
under construction, while no such fossil fuel plants are even considered. 166 The largest fossil plants are 1,000-1,500 MW, after which the
167
economies of scale cease and a price benefit inversion occurs.
This "size" development in nuclear generated power is matched by
technological increases in capacity ratings for high voltage transmission needed to transmit such massive amounts of power. In 1960, the
160. See 91st Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 18679 and S. 4141 embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 2135,
and the Legislative History of the 105(c) Amendments, H.R. REP. No. 1470, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., and Legislative History of P.L. 91-560, same session.
161. Supra note 67, at 27-30.
162. 1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, F.P.C. at 4-5 (1964).
163. Supra note 90, at 1-17-29.
164. Supra note 90, at 1-6-1.
165. Id.
166. Trends in the Nuclear Industry, supra note 135.
167. NUCLEAR POWER SURVEY, supra note 90 at IV-1-3 (1970).
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largest high voltage system was rated at 345 kilovolts, while a decade
later that amount was doubled. 168 With these advances have come
increased systemic reliability as well as substantially larger system
economies. 169 It is unfortunately apparent, however, that the economies
of scale are being denied to many hundreds of smaller systems which
cannot participate in nuclear power or high voltage transmission
interchange because of the barriers to entry mentioned earlier. It
should be noted that the projected cost of a light water reactor, the most
common type today, is approximately seven-hundred million dollars for
a 1000 MW rated facility. 70 The price of filing an application and legal
fees is projected at forty-five million dollars, and interest during the
construction period at eighty-nine million dollars!' 7' It is thus no
mystery that a rural electric cooperative which serves 10,000 farms in
Iowa and has a maximum load of four MW is not going to be capable of
becoming directly involved in nuclear power. 172 It is only when
enforcement of section 105 results in coordination that the benefits of
the one hundred billion dollar public investment in nuclear power will
accrue to that system. This access is particularly important in view of
the fact that nuclear plants are expected to constitute 44% of all
additions to generating capacity in the 1970's and 81% in the 1990's. 7 3
Finally, the degree which nuclear power assists cost efficiency in a
system or interconnected systems cannot be underestimated. A system
with 400 MW of fossil generated power has four times the reserve
obligations as a system with 800 MW of nuclear power - and if that 800
MW system is interconnected with other nuclear systems, the reserve
requirement declines geometrically, thus geometrically increasing the
quantity of power that can be sold as firm. 174 With smaller systems
excluded by being priced out of the market, thus ending yardstick
competition and organizational diversity, the retail cost of firm power
will rise in a dizzying spiral that has no limit.
B.

The Competitive Aspects of the Electric Utility Industry

As noted earlier, there is a trend toward consolidation in nuclear
applications which benefits the interconnected applicants greatly, and
bodes very poorly for those denied access to the interconnected nuclear
75
systems. This is the public position of the National Power Survey of
the Federal Power Commission, the Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, and the Antitrust Section of the Office of the Executive Legal
168.
169.

Id. at 1-13-7.
Id. at 1-13-8.

170. H.J. BOWERS COMPUTERIZED CONCEPTUAL COST ESTIMATE FOR STEAM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS, Phase 11-Users Manual, ORNL-TM-3743 Ch. 1 (1973).
171. Id.
172. It should be recalled that a nuclear plant is not economically viable unless it is
rated at 500 MW or better, supra note 135.

173. OFFICE OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS,
COMMISSION, NUC. POWER 1973-2000, at 4.
174.
175.

Supra note 90, at 11-1-56.
Supra note 116, and 141.

U.S.
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Director (formerly Office of the General Counsel) of the Nuclear
76
Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).
It is safe to say that these agencies reflect the "federal government
position." Opponents of oligopoly and concentration are presently
popular figures, and the Industrial Reorganization Act 177 (the Hart Bill

proposed by United States Senator Philip A. Hart), if passed, would place
total prohibitions on any form of major industry dominance and fully
regulate oligopoly. The Hart Bill seeks to establish a new commission to
assist the U.S. Department of Justice, the Nuclear Energy Commission,
Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal
Power Commission, Antitrust Section, not to mention various state
antitrust enforcement agencies. 178 Duplication in the review process of
this nature is unnecessary.
The Hart Bill would give top priority to energy, and six other major
industries, 179 and would initiate remediation proceedings if one of three
conditions occurred. There would be a rebuttable presumption of
unlawful monopoly if: (1) the average rate of return is in excess of 15%
of net worth over the past five years; or (2) there has been no substantial
price competition between two or more principle participants over a
three year period, or (3) there are four or fewer entities controlling 50%
or more of any given line of commerce. 80 . The Hart Bill is designed to
placate those advocates of total deconcentration and vigorous antitrust
enforcement. If enacted as proposed it could bring on an unparalleled
rush of confusion and could possibly destroy the electric utility industry,
and certainly the nuclear power industry.
It would be unrealistic to posit that the overwhelming majority of
authority favors such complete decentralization and deconcentration.
However, a number of decisions have suggested that these are, in
themselves, evils to be avoided. In United States v. United Can Co.'5 a
federal district court found that mere excessive size (referred to herein
as dominance) may be sufficient to create a violation of the antitrust
laws, when coupled with any overt conduct. Though the court decided
not to find against the American Can Company, the language of the
opinion is instructive:
[O]ne of the designs of the framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to prevent
the concentration in a few hands of control over great industries. They
[the framers] preferred a social and industrial state in which there
should be many independent producers. Size and power are themselves
facts some of whose consequences do not depend
182 upon the way in which
they are created or in which they are used.
176.
177.

Supra note 90.
Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); [1973] 5

(CCH) 50,116.
In re Cleveland Electrical Illuminating Co., Davis Besse supra note 122,

TRADE REG. REP.

178.

all of these agencies filed petitions at various points in the process of licensing the
nuclear facility, though not all before the same agency.
179. Supra note 177.
180. Id. at § 101(b).
181. 230 F. 859 (4th Cir. 1916).
182. Id. at 901.
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In United States v. Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand restated this
position: "It is possible because of indirect social or moral effect, to
prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon
his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those
engaged must accept the direction of a few. 18 3 This picture of
independence, designed to nurture competition, is fatal to an industry
which requires coordination. Realistic appraisal of Justice Hand's
commentary suggests the impracticability of such competition, for, as
one commentator noted, there has not been a full dissolution since
United States v. Corn ProductsRefining Co.184 Strict enforcement of the
185
antitrust laws may in fact lead to inflation, not competition.
Conversely, failure to enforce the antitrust laws in a regulated industry
can also lead to inflation. 186 Whether the regulatory agencies can
enforce the law so that only the "proper" result (sustained organizational diversity and yardstick competition) occurs is open to question.
The Division Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has stated that regulatory agencies often "pursued the common
goals of restricting competition by means of price regulation, entry
[W]e
regulations, technology control and service quality limitations ....
can no longer afford such wasteful government practices ....,187 One
year earlier, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Antitrust Section
Chief stated that continued regulation, via the antitrust laws was in fact
necessary to maintain competition. 188 It is possible, as Victor Kramer
(Director of the Institute for Public Representation) suggests, that the
ideals of the antitrust laws (lower prices and greater competition) do not
result when the laws are enforced by the government, and there should
be a "public counsel" who should join the other seven agencies already
89
directed by Congress to aid in the antitrust enforcement process.'
The best indicator of what will achieve the desired ends, or ideals,
may be found by examining the fears of the private power systems.
They stand to gain a great deal by concentration, so long as they may
remain exclusive in power pooling. Their fears involve being judged
(yardstick competition) against lesser sized systems who, due to
government subsidy, efficiency, realistic planning, low profit margin
requirements (particularly the public systems), and the ability to
purchase "unbundled' 90 bulk power, may do better than the large
183. United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
184. 234 F. 964 (2d Cir. 1916); see Kramer, Economic Concentration and the
Antitrust Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 165, 176.
185. Id. at 180.
186. See Part A of this section.
187. 1974 BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP., REGULATORY REFORM COMMISSION BILLS SUPPORTED, 690 at A-20 (Oct. 1974).

188. ALI-ABA AELR COURSE, Antitrust Review: Session IV held in Washington,
D.C. on September 21, 1973.
189. Supra note 184, at 180.
190. Unbundled power refers to power of a single generating facility on a large
system. A nuclear unit produces power more economically than a fossil unit; the ability to
purchase unit power, rather than having to pay at system wide allocated cost, would be a
positive result of section 105 enforcement. Large systems refer to this concept as "cream
skimming" and are highly critical of it.
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systems.19'
They also fear continued diverse ownership patterns
(organizational diversity), as they present opportunities for growth and
advances in technology (due to lower initial capitalization costs) which
the large systems may not be able to match.
Companies are perhaps the most fearful of this kind of competition
because it may have the greatest impact upon regulatory control.
Today, with the growing interdependence of systems and with many of
them purchasing their power needs, the yardstick concept may have
lost much of its usefulness unless the utility has access to economicallypriced power, either by membership in a power pool or as a result of
competition in the sale of wholesale power.
To illustrate, assume that a municipal system is buying all or most
of its power from a neighboring private system. There exists between
the two an indirect, but very real competition to serve their respective
areas since the state commission or voting public might well decide to
allow the system that furnished the cheapest power to serve both areas.
Unless the municipality has access to alternative sources of economical
power, either by joining a pool to build large, efficient generating
plants or by having access to alternative wholesale sources, the
neighboring system can virtually control the performance of the
municipal system through its control over the wholesale price of power.
Of course, the Federal Power Commission can regulate the wholesale
rate to eliminate this control, but to say that such regulation is
sufficient is either to reject the yardstick concept or to argue in a circle
since a regulated price cannot be used as a yardstick to measure the
effectiveness of regulation. Such control by selling systems is probably
very common and very effective, primarily because of the almost
universal control over transmission by the dominant selling system in
the area. This kind of 'unfair' competition is usually directed at
municipals and cooperatives but also occasionally at small private
systems, particularly when the seller is seeking to absorb the smaller
system by merger.
Yardstick competition takes on added importance as a rationale for
prohibiting such anticompetitive behavior when it is remembered that
the economies of scale at the distribution level result primarily from
density of service in a particular territory rather than from territorial
expansion. This somewhat blunts the argument in favor of formal
integration of neighboring distribution systems, except where the
system or systems are so small that they cannot efficiently perform
maintenance, billing, and other administrative functions.
Yardstick competition is not easily identified with the economist's
model of a competitive market. There is no direct confrontation in an
attempt to attract the consumer, unless the franchising authority is
regarded as the consumer. There is only indirect competition arising
out of comparison. Nevertheless, this form of competition can serve a
very valuable function in the regulatory process, and should therefore
be encouraged by prohibiting structure or conduct that makes such
comparisons unrealistic or impossible. 9'
191. Supra note 67, at 41-42.
192. Supra note 87, at 78.
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Similarily, one recognizes necessity for balance in the types of
business organizations involved in power production. 193 A nation of
regional power pools, open to any entity involved in transmission,
distribution or generation of power is an ideal - but a regulatory
antitrust ideal, achieved by administrative enforcement and not by
public prosecution for antitrust violations. 91 This is, in a sense, actual
competition, though not as it is normally envisioned. In the case of
nuclear power, and the electric utility industry, to "combine and
conspire" may be the only means to facilitate competition. 195
The Lustgarten-Brozen study, "Industrial Concentration and Inflation" 196 partially supports this contention:
Both theoretical and empirical evidence relating industrial concentration to inflation have been examined. The theoretical arguments
were that concentration promotes inflation because it allows sellers to
maintain prices when demands decline, to pass on inflationary wage
increase, and avoid competitive pressures to reduce costs. These
arguments were found to be inconsistent with the evidence, which
showed that prices and unit labor costs have increased more slowly in
concentrated industries than in other industries. The main reason for
superior performance of firms in concentrated industries has been
their greater gains in productivity. This finding suggests that
managers in these firms have been more successful in instituting cost
saving techniques of production. 197
Thus, the regulatory scheme must acknowledge the necessity of
concentration and maintain or develop new competitive arenas.
In the early 1900's direct competition in the electric utility industry
was disastrous. 198
It led to excessive duplication, massive waste,
excessive rates, and deterioration of investor confidence. 199 Regulation
substitutes for direct competition in a way that is designed to avoid such
results. It seeks to maintain limited retail load competition (borderline
competition), wholesale load competition, yardstick competition,
bulk
20 0
power supply competition, and interfuel competition.
Retail load competition is the least common form of regulation
substitute with the smallest impact of any of the above. In only one of
the seventy section 105 cases has there been an antitrust inconsistency
193. Supra note 87, at 592.
194. Id.
195. Naturally, criminal violations of 15 U.S.C. §1 must be prosecuted. However,

since combination is essential to competition, views will have to be modified as to what
constitutes a "violation" and what constitutes an inconsistency.
196. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

RESEARCH,

Dom, Aff.

Study 31 (1974).
197. Id. at 36.
198. Supra note 67, at 13.
199. Hearings on the Energy Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the House Comm on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt 1, at 115 (1970).

200. Supra note 67. at 14-27.
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alleged regarding retail load. 201 Indeed, the duplication of facilities and
factors suggest that retail competition
related environmental and cost202
may have only negative effects.
Borderline competition is a form of retail competition which exists
within fringe areas of a service area, e.g., electrical service for a new
industrial or residential development.2 03 This competition, like that
which occurs when an industry locates in a new region and seeks bids
for retail supply, is only "one time" in nature, though worthy of
protection, since it creates a laboratory for cost studies which can
determine if yardstick competition is achieving its objective. Care must
be taken in regulation to ensure that price reductions which may result
when entities competing for new retail loads are not paid for through
direct price increases on existing customers.
Wholesale load competition refers to the practice of sales of
wholesale power and energy components which are purchased for resale
in bulk, as opposed to retail distribution. Purchasers of such power
must have options in generation sources and open opportunities for
transmission services (wheeling). Thus, vital to wholesale load competition is complete coordination at the operational and planning level.
When a moderately sized municipal electric company has the opportunity to purchase power from two or more larger generating systems,
there can be actual competition. The municipality can bargain for unit
power cost, reserve benefits, emergency services, or many other factors
which the supplier systems can offer. However, should an encircling
generation and transmission system refuse to wheel power, the
competition ends.204 It is tragic that the vertical structure of the large
investor owned systems, which do in fact refuse to wheel, has resulted in
the demise of a number of smaller systems. Typically, the refusal will
distributing entities
entail a denial to wheel or form generating 2or
05
outside the service area of the larger system.
Yardstick competition, discussed earlier, is equally dependent on
coordination.2 16 The internal and external comparisons, reflecting
relative success of production, marketing, and all aspects of operations
can be made on the basis of geography, type of ownership, decisionmaking principles, size, or other systemic characterizations. The
maintenace of this delicate and easily misunderstood form of competition should be a primary regulatory goal.
Bulk power supply competition refers to the competition among the
suppliers of bulk power components. 20 7 Assuming continued organiza201.

In re Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Davis Besse, supra note 122.

202. A.

PHILLIPS, PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES

(1975).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Supra note 67, at 14-15.
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1970).
Id.; U.S.N.R.C. Doc. 75/061 supra note 67, at 18-20.
Id. at 20-22.
Id.

175-200
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tional diversity, there will remain a "market" of suppliers who compete
with each other, not only for sales to other systems (wholesale
competition), but in a broad sense of industrial competition e.g.,
competition to reduce generation costs thereby maximizing profits and
attracting investors, or attracting industrial loads. Additional bulk
power is sold "packaged"; the contents of the package varies depending
on the intensity and effectiveness of the competition. Thus, one major
utility selling firm power in one hundred MW blocks may offer it in
bulk, and add to the package various other service components (surplus
power, emergency service, transmission and interconnection servicing)
while another may offer a different package altogether. This process
stimulates the208most efficient allocation of resources and has a ceiling
effect on cost.
Interfuel competition2 9 again refers to the suppliers of bulk power,
and particularly to their resource management. It urges the utilization
unit cost quotients for oil, gas, coal, and nuclear power, and is
considered to be relatively successful in causing technological advances
in fuel supply.
These five forms of competition are considered to be effective, when
they are combined with appropriate regulation resulting in coordination. "Although the uncertainties of competitive rivalry may present
a barrier to coordination, industry regulators with adequate information can help the industry achieve a combination of competition and
coordination that benefits both industry and society. '210 Nonetheless, it
is acknowledged that total coordination may bring complacency and
stagnation.
Should that occur, the government is confident that
"regulation must be used to adjust the market ethos so that it once again
211
allows a competitive intensity sufficient to secure the desired results."
Because of the compatibility of coordination and competition in terms of
results, it is projected that they can exist simultaneously, and successfully.
VI.
A.

IN THE MATTER OF CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY,
MIDLAND UNITS I AND II
Corporate History of Applicant and Its Market Position.

On January 13, 1969, the Consumers Power Company, a private
investor-owned utility operating a wholly integrated generation, transmission, and distribution system in Michigan's lower peninsula filed an
application to operate two nuclear power plants, known as Midland,
Unit I and Midland Unit II on a site owned by the company in the
Tittabawasee River basin in Midland County. 212 Section 105(c) had not
208. Id.
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id. at 42.
211. Id.
212. In re Consumers Power Co., Midland Units I & I, 50-329A, 50-330A
[hereinafter cited as "Consumers"]. Documents available in the Public Documents Room
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
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yet been passed by Congress, and so pursuant to Section 105(c)8 of the
Atomic Energy Act, the construction permit was issued to allow
construction to begin, though it was clear that the permit was subject to
any antitrust conditions found by hearings and settlement between the
Atomic Energy Commission [hereinafter A.E.C.] and Consumers.
Consumers Power Company is one of five investor-owned utilities in
Michigan's lower peninsula. Consumers services a 27,000 square mile
area, with 1,110,000 customers and a peak load of 4,000,000 kilowatts. 213
Consumers operates a fully interconnected system with Detroit Edison,
(a private investor-owned system) by utilization of four extra high
voltage transmission lines, and participates in coordinated planning
and operation with Detroit Edison. Detroit Edison, the largest utility in
Michigan, has generating capacity of over 6000 MW and nuclear
generation, via15the Greenwood Units 214 and the Enrico Fermi Electric
Power Plant.
The early history of Consumers Power Company (circa, 1910)
reveals control and part ownership by one W.A. Foote, at which time the
company was called Commonwealth Power, Railway and Light Company. 21 6 Foote was a central figure in Michigan politics at the time, and
was influential in granting preferred utilities perpetual franchises in
various service areas. Consumers has fifty-three such Foote Act
2 7
Franchises, 961 thirty-year franchises and four open franchises. 1
In the period from 1910-1919, Consumers sought to achieve control
over hydro generation in the Michigan Lower Peninsula, and achieved
73%control by 1919.218 This pattern continued through 1950 and beyond,
and in the 1950's, control was wrested from the Michigan Public Service
Company, thus acquiring the service rights to Chebovgan, Gaylord,
Ludington, Montague, Traverse City, and about 100 other relatively
small municipal
cities, including White Cloud, Bellaire, and Kala21 9
mazoo.

To service these systems, Consumers presently has a generating
capacity of 4,321 MW, a figure which will be increased by 25% when the
two Midland Units go into full service. In addition to generation, the
company controls
nearly all the extra high-voltage (345 KW and above) and nearly all
the high voltage (44-345 KW) transmission in its service area. Since the
system is fully coordinated there is access to the benefits of other
systems, particularly in terms of reserves. These systems include the
massive Detroit Edison Corporation; Ontario Hydro-Electric Co-op, the
Indiana-Michigan Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison
of Illi22
nois, and the Northern Indiana Public Service Company.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

1972 Annual Report of Consumers Power Company.
A.E.C. Doc. 50-452, 50-453.
A.E.C. Doc. 50-341.
Supra note 143, at 19.
Supra note 143, at 34.
Supra note 143, at 20.

220.

Id. at 23.

219. Id.
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One of the benefits of this intersystem coordination is a tremendous
savings in reserve requirements. While Lansing Electric Company, a
competitor of Consumers which is not granted the benefits of coordination by Consumers, must carry reserves of 39% of system generating
capacity, Consumers needs are set at 17%.221 This 17% amount is a direct
result of Consumers membership in the Michigan Pool [hereinafter MP]
along with Detroit Edison.
The smaller systems in Consumers service area also formed a pool,
Michigan Municipal Cooperative Power Pool [hereinafter MMCPP].
Comprised of members of smaller systems, the MMCPP alleged that it
had been unable to achieve satisfactory intersystem coordination with
The largest pool member, Lansing, has generating
Consumers.
capacity of 320 MW while the next eight systems have the capacity and
need to generate an average of 35 MW (compared to 4,321 MW of
Consumers). These systems, including Holland, Grand Haven, Traverse
City, Coldwater, Zeeland, Hart, Lowell, Hillsdale and others, are
organizationally diverse, enjoy different benefits in operation, and, if
interconnected, may insure yardstick competition in the area. However,
for the last twenty-five years, the government has claimed that
Consumers has resisted most efforts at achieving coordinated planning
and coordinated operation. 222 The majority of requests to negotiate have
allegedly been denied by Consumers, and where coordination agree223
ments have occurred, they have been allegedly weak and one-sided.
While Consumers allegedly refuses to coordinate in almost every
method described infra, (Part VI) it does supply and sell wholesale bulk
power to municipal systems. These arrangements apply to perhaps 70%
of the systems within the applicant's service area.
The addition of the Midland Unit units is vital to Consumers Power
Company,2 24 but also forms a difficult competitive barrier to the systems
who are not part of the Michigan Pool, if those systems are not granted
access to the units for economic and environmental reasons. 225 With
hydro-electric sites exhausted, and gas and oil scarce, the remaining
new generating options for Consumers are coal or nuclear. These are
regional considerations, for each region of this country, in the future
will be allowed to generate only such power as it needs.

226

Additionally,

the prospects of large scale coal generation in the Lower Peninsula are
221. Prehearing Brief of A.E.C. Regulatory Staff filed Nov. 20, 1973, concerning
the proceeding of In re Consumers Power Co., Midland Units I and II, supra note 212.
222. For example, in 1963 and 1964, Consumers refused to negotiate an emergency
power contract with Wolverine and Northern Michigan, almost causing their corporate
at 91.
note
demise,
223. supra
Under
the143,
Lansing,
Holland Agreement, Consumers need only supply power if
it has excess on hand. Id.
224. Supra note 212.
225. See, e.g., Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power, supra note 147
(Testimony of Dr. Merril Cisebud at 1397).
226. 1 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, supra note 90.
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bleak. The Supplemental Environmental Report of Consumers Power
Co., states the coal problem thusly:
The ash collected from a coal fired plant.., would amount to about onehalf million tons per year. The problems of disposing of this quantity of
ash in an environmental [sic] acceptable way are naturally formidable
.... Sulfur dioxide would also be emitted in large quantities from a
coal-fired installation. . . . There would also be emissions of other
contaminants such as nitrogen oxides and trace elements that . . .
represent atmospheric contamination that would not exist with a
nuclear plant .... With the impact of environmental considerations and
new Federal, state and local standards
for industry emissions, coal
27
faces further market uncertainty.
These projections, if true, bode poorly for the municipals as well as
for Consumers, absent full nuclear coordination. The sale of wholesale
power for retail use is a non-market factor-and that was the extent of
the power exchange as of the filing of the application. Alleged refusals
to sell unit power, to grant access to the unit, and to sell wholesale bulk
power for resale has effectively prohibited area wide competition.
Blocked in by traditional barriers to entry, transmis.ion refusals to
wheel, and a lack of self generation for environmental and economic
reasons, Consumers seems destined to continue its pattern of acquisition
until its present dominance becomes a complete monopoly.
The existing competition must contend with Consumers stated
expansion desires:
The plan is simply the extention of a long-standing endeavor on the part
of both Detroit Edison and Consumers Power to achieve the lowest
possible operating and capital costs. ... Broadly, purposes of the plan
are:
.To perpetuate economy and dependability in production and
transmission of electric power
.To facilitate supplying emergency power as needed in cases of
storm damage or other disruption
.To advance the art and science of interconnection through
further integration of 22the
existing Michigan state-wide electric
8
transmission network.
While MMCPP struggled for survival, Consumers enhanced its
position by becoming a member of the East Central Reliability
Coordination Agreements [hereinafter ECAR], which is a regional
coordinating group established to insure and encourage intersystem

229
reliability and coordinated planning and operation on a massive level.

227. S.E.R. Consumer Power Co. at 5.2 (1)-8; supra note 212.
228. Memorandum, Concerning Electric Power Pooling Programs of Consumers
Power Co. and Detroit Edison, Inc. Prepared for Michigan Congressional Delegation 1972
(on file); supra note 212.
229. See National Electric Reliability Council Agreement of May 1, 1968 amended
January 1, 1970; August 8, 1970 and June 19, 1977, on file, supra note 212.
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Because of Consumers alleged refusal to grant access to the vital
coordinating media, high voltage transmission and nuclear unit generated power, MMCPP has been unable to participate in ECAR.
The present position of the applicant, Consumers, is one of dominance. The issues in the antitrust hearing did not go to whether the
applicant possessed a monopoly, as that was assumed by the parties and
acknowledged by the Licensing Board. 231 Consumers share of the
wholesale bulk power market is 85%, its share of the retail market is
84%, leaving no doubt that in generation, the applicant possesses
monopoly power by sheer size. 231 Consumers also possesses a 9000 mile
transmission system including 1400 miles of integrated and interconnected higher voltage transmission. The coordination with IndianaMichigan Cooperative and with Detroit Edison, Inc. saves Consumers
millions of dollars annually. 232 Thus with control of over 98% of high
voltage transmission and 100% of extra high voltage (needed for nuclear
power plants electric generation), Consumers possesses a monopoly in
transmission. 233 The impact of such monopoly is massive, but not per se
unlawful, unless such power is used to maintain the monopoly-conduct
which would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws. 234 Indeed, there
are those who argue that monopoly power plus normal business
practices
which enhance that power or maintain it is a violation of the
235
law.
B.

The Monopoly Power of Consumers Power Co.*

The record supports the claim that Consumers Power Company
possessed a virtual monopoly in its service area. It also suggests that
over the past fifteen years, this monopoly power has had a highly
detrimental effect on the other participants in the market place. While
the parties in the antitrust hearing were restricted to going back no
earlier than 1960, 23there
is authority to suggest that such a limitation
6
was unwarranted.
After an initial investigation, the Department of Justice issued an
"advice letter" on June 28, 1971, pursuant to section 105(c) of the Atomic
230. Initial Decision, In re Consumers Power, Midland Units I and II LPB 75-39,
N.R.C. Doc. 50-329A, 50-330, NCRI 7517 at 112 (July 18, 1975).
231. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
232. Brief In Support of the Exceptions of the Department of Justice, In re
Consumers Power Co., Midland Units I & II; supra note 212 at 59.
233. Supra note 232 (for percentages) and note 231 (for conceptual conclusion).
234. See legislative history for 42 U.S.C. § 2135, suvra note 160.
235. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 510 (7th ed. 1967); Turner, The Scope of
Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1210-16 (1969).
*Consumer Power Company did prevail in the case under discussion. Therefore, any
conclusions or assertions made in this article must be viewed as academic in nature,
presented purely to stimulate scholarly discourse and further study. The decision in
question has been appealed to the United States Regulatory Commission Appeals Board,
where the factual data discussed in this article may be reviewed de novo.
236. See F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1948); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 n.3 (1965); United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curium 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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Energy Act, as amended, wherein it was stated "we believe that
granting the license sought herein may maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws."23 7 Four years of intensive discovery,

initiated by publication of a "notice of antitrust hearing" published in
the Federal Register 23 8 resulted in a protracted licensing hearing,
wherein the issue was whether the granting of an unconditioned license
would maintain a situation inconsistent with antitrust laws.23 9 Petitions

were filed by the N.R.C. Staff, the Department of Justice, and a group of
intervenors comprised of representatives from Cold Water, Grand
Haven, Holland, Traverse City, Zeeland, the Northern Michigan
Electric Cooperative, the Wolverine Electric Cooperative, and the
MMCPP. The petitioners argued that the granting of an unconditional
license would maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
It should be noted that the remedy sought in this proceeding was a
license condition, i.e., a detailed directive requiring Consumers to
coordinate. These proceedings were not antitrust "trials" wherein
dissolution, divestiture, or criminal sanctions are pursued. 240 In such
proceedings, the traditional quantum of proof required to prove a
"violation" of the law is not needed. Rather, proof of an "inconsistency"
- a far less stringent standard - is required. This requirement may be
likened to the proof requirement in section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as described in the Cement Institute241 and F.T.C. v.
Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., Inc.242 cases.
It was in the context of a licensing hearing for a license to operate
the Midland Units I and II that the allegations of Consumers
monopolistic abuses became matters of public record. Initial testimony
by the Chairman of the Northern Michigan Cooperative, who was also
spokesman for the MC pool pointed to the consequences of small electric
entities being isolated from the regional power exchange market:
Q. Are there any impediments, or have there been any impediments to programs of coordinated operation and planning by the
Municipal Cooperative Pool?
A. Yes, very serious impediments. I'm sure you all are aware of
the geography of northern Michigan, where the area in which northern
Michigan and the pool group operate, we are isolated to the east and
west by water which is a very effective barrier to relationships, power
supply - power relationships with systems to the east or west.
Q. Do you have any opportunities for coordination other than - or
opportunities which do not require cooperation of Consumers Power

Company? ...
237.

Supra note 230.

238. 37 Fed. Reg. 7726 (April 19, 1972).

239. For reasons not readily ascertainable, the Department of Justice determined
that this would be a "maintain" case, and not a "create and maintain" case, See 42 U.S.C. §
2135.240.
See generally, N.R.C. Brief in Support of Exceptions, In re Consumers
Power
Co., Midland Units I & II, supra note 212 and 221 at 81 et. seq.
241. 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
242. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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A. Well, our problem there is one of economic feasibility to reach the
system of the affiliate of the American Electric Power Company, which
has facilities in the southwest part of the lower peninsula, and to move
substantial quantities of power would require very heavy investments in
transmissionfacilities. That's likewise true with access to the facilities of
the Detroit Edison Company operating in the southeast and eastern
portion of the state.
Our access to other power suppliers, our economic access to other
major suppliersmust be via the facilities of the Applicant.24 [Emphasis
added.]

This testimony was later corroborated by that of John Keen,
Manager of Wolverine Electric Cooperative:
Q. Now, why do you feel that access to wheeling services from the
Consumers Power Company is necessary to your system - and when I
say "your system," I refer to the Wolverine Electric System, sir?
A. For several reasons: one is to eliminate wherever possible
duplication of transmission facilities.
Number two, to be able to make purchase and sale arrangements,
economy power, and so forth, with other utilities, other than Wolverine
itself and Consumers Power, itself, perhaps.
Q. Is access to Consumers Power wheeling service an important
element of either present-day or future coordination attempts by your
system?
A. Very much so.
Q.

Could you explain that, sir?

We could not make arrangements with other utilities
A. Yes ....
such as Indiana and Michigan Electric Cooperative, Detroit
2 44Edison, or
the City of Lansing . . . without wheeling arrangements.

On the subject of being denied access to coordination, further
testimony revealed that "[t]he primary problem for small utilities... is
the lack of any transmission facilities availableto us in order to actually
move blocks of power around so we can coordinate.

' 245

The witness

testifying went on to note that with these services "we [the smaller
systems] could go to Detroit Edison, I & M, anybody ... for wholesale
power. ' 246 Thus, absent the services there is no actual or "yardstick"
competition, no internal evaluations or external assessments, in other
words, perfectly suppressed competition by denial of access to transmission. 24 This refusal to coordinate transmission services is done at
the expense of yardstick competition and at a massive financial loss to
243.
Hearings,
244.
245.
246.
247.

Transcript, In re Consumers Power, Midland Power Units I & II, Initial
N.R.C. Doc. 50-229A, 230A, at 1217-19 [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
Id. at 4511-12.
Id. at 4330-31, (Testimony of Stephen Fletcher, Alpena Power Co.,).
Id. at 4333-34.
See Part VI supra.
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the smaller entities, thus jeopardizing organizational diversity. Direct
testimony revealed that if the smaller systems could purchase wholesale
bulk power elsewhere (other than from Consumers) even paying the
maximum wheeling charge, smaller systems would still experience
2 48
great savings.
The transmission monopoly then coupled with the refusals to grant
access to it, has led to injury to competition, and thus would seem to
create an inconsistency with section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 249

Moreover, it has forced utilities to ignore the

nuclear power supply option. For example utility executive Earl Brush
of Lansing, Michigan in answer to a question involving the use of
nuclear powered generation, testified as follows:
A. If the City of Lansing is to ever participatein nuclearpower we
are going to have to have the benefits of wheeling.
The municipals - We are too small, as an individual municipal
system, to build a nuclear plant. Our information is that 500 m.w. and
up, or maybe 500 m.w. is the smallest size that is economical to
consider. With our load we could not afford to build, or justify building
that large a unit.
Our effort in the nuclear field is to work with some presumably
investor-owned utility to own a share; and we have so asked Consumers
to consider us in their Quanicassee plant, in writing. Part of that
request was wheeling, part of the request was an operating agreement
covering the jointly owned facilities. So we, as well as the rest of the
municipals, to ever participate in nuclear power, are going to have to
have wheeling arrangements. Otherwise it's going to pass us by ([TR]
2292-2293).

Q. Mr. Brush, does the [Stanley Engineers] study include purchases from parties other than Consumers as an alternative?
A. No, sir, it does not, because we have no contractual arrangements with anyone else.
Q. Why didn't you have any contractual arrangements with
anyone else?
A. Well, we butt up against Consumers Power in our service
area -

, ,* *The nearest transmission line to us of another generating
utility is some 15 miles due west of us. It's the Wolverine G & T. And
Detroit Edison is a considerable distance from us, and we have no
wheeling capacity at the present time to interconnect with anybody

else. 2 50

248. Supra note 243, at 4074, (Testimony of Harold Munn, Goldwater Bd. of P.U.C.).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
250. Supra note 243, at 2333-34.
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Thus, not only have the municipals been denied transmission, but

25
this denial has severely restricted their power supply options. 1

In the prepared testimony of Dr. Harold Wein, an economist who
testified for the Department of Justice at the hearing, the plight of the
municipals is succinctly stated:
The consequences for small electric utilities are not difficult to see.
If they cannot engage in the bulk energy exchange market - if, in
short, access to pools and coordination is denied them on equal and
equitable terms, they will fall further behind in the competitive
struggle ....
The gap
between their costs and those of the larger
25 2
companies will grow.

What Dr. Wein's testimony reveals is a party, who has apparently
chosen to exercise the most efficient means of maintaining its dominance. One of the rewards of such dominance has been a decline in the
number and variation of systems in the lower peninsula, i.e., a decline in
organizational diversity.
C. The Monopoly Power Exercised.
Consumers' refusal to coordinate is a matter of public record. 253 The
Board found Consumers to be consistent, or rather "not inconsistent"
with the antitrust laws because the management of the applicant had
collectively determined that such coordination would not result in a net
benefit to the applicant; although, as part "B" supra reveals, these
policies had a decidedly anticompetitive effect on the competition of the
applicant. Moreover, the applicant had an avowed purpose in its plans:
"... the first goal of the company's marketing activity or program
concerningother utility systems in its service areais, of course, to acquire
these systems. , 5 4 At the hearing, there were attempts to deny that this
was a "serious" statement of policy. However the Board's refusal
' '255
to allow an attempt to introduce a "New Policy of Consumers Power.
The position which the Board accepted indicated how the company
might prevent the dependent municipal systems from achieving "a
251.

Id. at 1726-28, where utility executive Joseph Wolfe of Traverse City testifies:
A. Any viable or any reasonable way of delivering this power to Traverse
City from a remote source would have to come over somebody else's transmission
system. The transmission system of the cooperatives might have been useful for
this purpose, but only insofar as it was capable of handling these power
deliveries, and its system was not designed during that period of time to handle
any larger power transfers than what it probably ...would reasonably need for
itself. So that would mean that either very large transmission facilities
would be involved to upgrade the cooperative's transmission system of the
transmission system of Consumers Power Company would have to be utilized.
And this did not appear to be a method which could be accomplished due to the
expressed attitude of Consumers Power Company during negotiations and
discussions that were held with them (Transcript 1726-1728). [Emphasis added].
252. Testimony of H. Wein, at 65-66, filed November 1975; supra note 212.
253. Supra note 230, at 71-83, Initial Decision.
254. Memorandum of R.L. Paul, June 1966, citied at 39 of Dept. Brief, supra note
141.

255. Supra note 230, at 91.
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completely independent power source." 25 6 Five years after the presentation had been made, the vice president for Marketing restated the
policy of the company. Mr. B. G. Campbell allegedly stated that
or7
"hopefully [Consumers] would eliminate future increased penetration '25
influence of a public power group in the Applicant's service area.
These policies were not idle threats of a stumbling giant but were
accurate embodiments of a pattern of conduct which had an apparently
negative effect on competition.
Specifically, investigation revealed Consumers apparent refusal to
coordinate in 1963 and 1964 with the Northern Michigan and Wolverine
Cooperatives. 258 The cooperatives had sought a coordination agreement,
but Consumers had allegedly refused, offering only the sale of wholesale
power for retail distribution. This alleged refusal effectively prevented
the cooperatives from entering the regional power exchange. Consumers' refusal was phrased thusly:
It continues to be obvious to me that both Northern Michigan and
Wolverine have a strong desire to interconnect and pool with Consumers
Power Company. This desire seems to preclude realistic consideration
of other power supply proposals that can and should be used by both of
these G&Ts to provide them with their future growth requirements. As
indicated in my letter to Mr. Lee [of the Rural Electrification
Administration], any interconnection and pooling arrangementshould
create similar benefits for both parties. After careful and considered
review, we conclude there are insufficient benefits for ConsumersPower
Company through such an arrangementto adequately protect the best
interests of our stockholders and existing regular customers. We are
still of the opinion that the revised proposed [wholesale firm power]
contract offers the best short- and long-range solution to the cooperative power supply requirements. 59 [Emphasis added.]
The records reveal other refusals to coordinate by the applicant with
Northern Michigan in 1967. In 1968 when the MMCPP was formed
with the express purpose of achieving coordinated operation with major
systems, the MMCPP sought out the transmission services of Consumers. 260 It took over five years for any agreement to be worked out;
however, when completed the agreement was alleged to be unsatis261
factory and one-sided.
In that same period, 1966-1973, Consumers allegedly refused to
enter into coordination agreements with Traverse City and Edison
Sault Electric Company. 26 2 Perhaps more significantly, Consumers
officially adopted a policy whereby all "undesirable" third parties

231.

256.
257.
258.

Supra note 230.
Prehearing Brief of the Department of Justice, supra note 143, at 42.
Department of 'Justice Exhibit No. 32; see Consumers Power Co., supra note

259.
260.
261.
262.

Id., exhibit No. 41.
Transcript at 1182-84 (Testimony of A. Steinbrecker).
Supra note 232, at 101-06.
Id. at 110-13.
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would be forever barred from the Michigan Pool (Consumers and
Detroit Edison). This was a conscious policy which stated inter alia,
2 63
that the MMCPP members and the MMCPP itself were undesirable.
By excluding these parties Consumers effectively prevented MMCPP
members access to nuclear power and to the vital coordinating medium
of transmission.
Additionally, the agreements which were signed were no great aid
to the competing systems, e.g., the Holland-Consumers interconnection
agreement is silent as to reserve responsibilities for Consumers. 264 By
this omission, Consumers achieved its purpose of acquiring a bulk
power purchaser, while not enhancing the purchasers position in the
bulk power market. Such a policy, coupled with a consistent series of
refusals to wheel power, results in Consumers' ability to maintain
customers, while denying bulk power supply options to customers,
restricting competition, and in general improperly utilizing their dominance over transmission.
Another alleged abuse by Consumers involved its denial to grant
direct access to the nuclear units for which it sought a license.
Northern Michigan Electric, Traverse City, Alpena Power, Grand
Haven, Coldwater and others had sought direct access via ownership
shares, or other alternative means. 265 The denials by Consumers came
as quickly as the offers were received. 266 These denials were based on (1)
a lack of timeliness of the requests, (2) a lack of necessity of direct
access, (in the opinion of Consumers); or (3) the fact that Consumers
believed access unnecessary since Consumers served to supply wholesale bulk power needs. 267 Consumers' rationale that the municipals
could build their own plant 268 is untenable since (1) the construction of

the Midland, Greenwood, and Fermi Units was already underway; (2)
there was no other essential high voltage transmission made available;
economic and environmental reasons
and (3) there were numerous
26 9
against such construction.
The agreements of wholesale bulk power, as mentioned earlier,
were fraught with problems for smaller utilities. One of the worst was
the power sale restriction which Consumers placed on many systems
with which it had been interconnected. An example of such an
agreement is informative:
Connections: It is agreed that the electric energy to be supplied

by Consumer's Power to Holland hereunder shall be used solely to meet

263. Id.
264. Department Exhibit No. 105, at 5, supra note 212.
265. See Department Exhibits Nos. 27, 24, 122, and Transcript 4141-42, 4350,
Consumers Power Co., supra note 212.
266. Supra note 232, at 133.
267. Transcript at 144-48, 172-74, 175-77.
268. Id. at 1613-14 (Testimony of Mr. Wolfe).
269. Id. at 2808, 2558 (Expert testimony of Mayben); Wash. 117-73, at 5-7; 22
Appendix E; Transcript at 6351, 1550, 4431 (all regarding the inaavisability of
construction at less than 500 m.w.).
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a part of the requirements of Holland in the operation of its electrical
system located in the State of Michigan. It is further agreed that
without the written consent of Consumer's Power, Holland shall make
no interconnection with any person, firm, corporation, government
agency or other entity which might result in either party hereto
becoming engaged, directly or indirectly, in a transmission or sale at
wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. If Holland makes
such an interconnection without such written consent, Consumer's
Power may, at its option, terminate this agreement forthwith by giving
written notice of its intention to do so.270 [Emphasis added.]

Such a provision makes it a breach of contract for the captive
systems to participate in the regional
power exchange market with any
27
entity other than Consumers. 1
The hearing revealed a great deal of evidence suggesting an
extensive system of territorial allocation among major systems to the
exclusion of minor systems. 272 These arrangements were developed in a
series of "gentlemen's agreements," and had an inhibiting effect on
smaller systems. Of equal significance is the preemptive coordination
exclusions which Consumers allegedly undertook over the past decade.
Preemptive exclusions involve
a situation where a utility system with generation requests coordinating services, particularly a reserve-sharing arrangement, but
instead is offered and is forced to accept a wholesale for resale contract.
This conduct is equally effective as preemptive coordination in
forestalling
the formation and evolution of an independent power
28
exchange.
These exclusions or refusals were a part of Consumers' policy, and are
27
indicative of their quest to maintain dominance. 1
Based on these alleged abuses of established monopoly power, it
would seem only logical that a licensing board would be compelled to
find that the activities under the license would maintain a series of
situations inconsistent with the antitrust laws. However, such was not
the case.
Upon a close reading of the decision, 275 analysis suggests that while
the Board knew that the factual situation was "inconsistent with the

antitrust laws," a misunderstanding of the factual nexus issue forced
270. Department of Justice Exhibit No. 100, supra note 212.
271. Supra note 232, at 144. Some of the involved systems are listed below. The
"DJ" designation refers to the exhibit number of the Department of Justice in their §
105(c) proceeding. The systems are:
Northern Michigan (1967 contract; DJ No. 64), Edison Sault Electric
Company (1966 contract; DJ No. 800), City of Lansing (1964 contract; DJ No.
91), Southeastern Michigan Rural Electric Cooperative (1967 contract; DJ No.
98).
272. Department of Justice Exhibit No. 128, supra note 212.
273. Department of Justice Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 232, at 162.
274. See Department of Justice Exhibit Nos. 7, 143, 145; Transcript at 1237.
275. Supra note 230.
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the Board to conclude that these inconsistencies were not sufficiently
related to the nuclear unit to allow for a finding against the applicant.
However, the record reveals a direct relationship between every one of
the inconsistencies alleged and the nuclear unit. In terms of system
generating capacity, system reserves, system reliability, capacity and
energy for sale to Consumers' customers and other utilities, there was
sufficient proof of a systemic effect. An increase of 25% generating
capacity is systemic and affects an entire system.
In terms of the "factual nexus," the record reveals the following:
(A) A nuclear generating plant is not an independent part of most
276
systems, and certainly not an independent part of Consumers' system.
(B) Since a new large unit on a system of smaller units may
dramatically increase reserve requirements, intrasystem and inter277
system coordination is needed to maximize benefits from the facility.

(C)

coordination the 1300 MW Midland
Absent mass intersystem
28

Units would be impracticable.

1

Nonetheless, the Board did not find a sufficient factual nexus. This
was based on the Board's rather substantial confusion in terminology.
There was an apparent assumption by the Board that the element of
a substantive finding of "misuse."
nexus, when proved, must 27include
9
This of course is incorrect.
D. The Initial Decision
On July 18, 1975, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rendered
its initial decision in In the Matter of Consumers Power, LPB 75-79,
Midland Units I and II, N.R.C. Doc. 50-329A and 50-330A. 280 As
mentioned earlier, the decision appears erroneous in its factual
determinations and legal analyses. First, Consumers is the first
administrative antitrust decision pursuant to section 105(c) of the
Atomic Energy Act. Accordingly, there are few precedents that can be
considered binding. Much that the Board wrote in its decision which is
deemed in this article as erroneous is a matter of opinion. Although
there was a large body of secondary authority for the Board to consult, it
seems that the decision runs contrary to such sources. Second, the
tragic death of Jerome Garfinkel, Chairman of the Consumers Licensing Board
must have had a substantial impact on the other two sitting
281
judges.
276. See supra note 212 (Prepared Testimony of Helfman at 34).
277. Transcript at 1635, 5529 (Testimony of Wolf and Rogers).
278. Transcript at 5544, 64 (Testimony of Rogers and Wein).
279. See Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 50-55.
280. Supra note 230.
281. Chairman Garfinkel was actively involed at every step of the case, participating in the hearings and guiding the proceedings in an expert and professional manner.
His death was, as the Board notes, at 115 of the Initial Decision, a tragic loss to those who
knew him, and to the legal profession. It is particularly noteworthy that he was the
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Consumers holds that the granting or issuing of the permit to
construct the Midland facility would not create or maintain a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws. The decision was limited to the
"maintain" aspect, since it was agreed by the parties that "create"
aspects would not be litigated at the time of the hearing.
Essentially, Consumers holds that an electrical system which is
dominant and has monopoly power may exercise that power to maintain
its position. The Board determined a broad relevant market in a
geographical sense, but held that the product market related solely to
coordination between the Consumers and the smaller systems. Further,
the Board concluded that the "regional power exchange" market was
outside the relevant product market.282 In terms of legal application,
83
the decision gives primary emphasis to the Sherman Act Standard,
and does not utilize the Federal Trade Commission Act 284 as a primary

legal principle. 285 The Board found further that an applicant, who has
85% control over generation and 100% control over extra-high voltage
transmission, does not have the power to deny coordination among the
Intervenors. 28 6 Additionally, the decision applies a "misuse-immunity"
standard regarding the critical question of applicability of the
antitrust laws to a regulated industry. 28 7 This segment of the opinion
states that a licensee can be acting inconsistently with the antitrust laws
pursuant to section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act only when the
applicant misuses the activities under the license, i.e., the nuclear
reactor, in an anticompetitive manner. The Board held:
(a) Nexus exists between otherwise lawful activities under a
proposed license and a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, if,
and only if, the said activities are misused so as to be a materialelement
and a substantialfactorin a scheme or conspiracythe purpose or effect of
which is to cause the creation or maintenance of said situation.

(b) Activities under a license issued by the Commission pursuant
to statute per se cannot create or maintain a situation inconsistent with
the antitrust laws.
(c) Activities under a license issued by the Commission pursuant
to statute, can create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the
antitrust laws if, and only if, such activities constitute a material
element and a substantialfactorin a scheme or conspiracythe purpose or
antitrust expert on the Board, and that this most critical of decisions was thus written
without Judge Garfinkel's excellent understanding of the facts, the record, and the
antitrust laws. It should be noted that 10 C.F.R., § 2.785 et seq. (1970) and the Statements
of Consideration thereunder indicate that the panels in these cases are to be comprised of
experts from different fields, each person to be an expert in an area relevant to the case at
bar.
282. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 40-44, 93, 108.
283. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1,2 (1970).
284. 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as amended. 15 U.S.C. 41-58 (1973).
285. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 47-50.
286. Id. at 99.
287. Id. at 55-61.
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effect of which is to cause the creation of maintenance of a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws.229 [Emphasis added.]

This interplay between nexus and "misuse," and the addition of
"scheme or conspiracy." and "purpose and effect" are new additions to
the law, if indeed they survive the appeal of the decision. Part C supra,
regarding what constitutes a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws, fairly well excludes Federal Trade Commission § 5 "reasonable
probability of inconsistency" and "incipiency" concepts, all mandated in
the legislative history. 289 The finding that activities under the license
means "within the nuclear plant" is equally novel. It is here that
arises, i.e., a licensed activity cannot be a violation of law per
immunity
9
se .2

0

Regarding the requirement to coordinate, the Board found that such
requirement would be tempered if both parties received a benefit from
the coordination. This finding, when applied to Consumers, reveals that
with regard to a scarce resource a dominant entity may refuse to deal
with others, so long as no net benefit can be shown.29 1 Regarding
refusals to wheel or grant access to nuclear facilities, the Consumers
holding provides that these too can be justified, so long as the r3fusal
was not part of a scheme or conspiracy whose purpose or effect is to attain
or maintain monopoly position, or so long as the refusal can be justified
that the coordination could result in no benefit to the
by a showing
92
applicant.
Factually, the Board found that 85% control of generation and 100%
control of transmission did not create a bottleneck, 293 that offering bulk
power at wholesale for retail was sufficient from a competitive
standpoint, 294 and that a restrictive coordination covenant which
prevented third party dealings was not inconsistent with section
105(c). 295 Exclusions from the Michigan Pool, conspiracies to limit
competition29 6 (as described supra regarding the R. L. Paul Memorandum), and even attempts to monopolize were all found to be consistent
with the antitrust laws. These were justified based on "moral" duties to
shareholders,2 9 7 and the lack of sufficient power to actually achieve
monopoly. 298 Regarding access, the Board found that a denial of access
to 500 MW or greater units was not factually problematic since the
one or many smaller nuclear units of
smaller utilities could construct
299
seventy-five MW or less.
288.

Id. at 61.

289. Supra note 160.
290. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 40-60.
291. Id. at 61-66.
292. Id. at 70-83.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 111-12.
295. Id. at 92-95. See part C of this section on exercise of monopoly power.
296. Supra note 251 and accompaning text.
297. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 64-66.
298. Id. at 102-03.
299. Id. at 110-11.
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By minimizing the obligation to coordinate 300 and making prelicensing review almost an impossibility, 0 1 the Consumers decision
stands as an anachronism in the antitrust field.
E.
1.

Critique of the Consumers Decision
"Net Benefit" Problems

Perhaps the greatest problem of the Consumers decision lies in the
fact that the overall concepts of regional coordinated planning and
coordinated development (Part V of this article) are given a secondary
position to the so-called "moral right" of an individual business entity to
prosper and benefit from each transaction that it undertakes. The
Consumers rationale is as if the decision in United States v. Otter Tail
3 3
Power Co. 30 2 had never been written. Likewise, the Wolf Creek
Commission opinion, which by law sets precedent for licensing boards,
was ignored in terms of its nexus analysis. The Consumers decision
overlooks legislative history, judicial precedent, and at times common
logic in seeking to protect the ability of private enterprise to maximize
investment.
The decision is plagued by a pro-private investor bias. For example,
the Board held that where an applicant for a license seeks to have that
license issued with no "antitrust conditions," the burden of proof rests on
the government to prove violations, not on the applicant to prove
consistency with the antitrust laws. 30 4 This is at odds with the
Commission's own rules,30 5 and with case law which holds that a
proponent of an order has the burden of persuasion in a case such as
this. 30 6 While this point will probably not stir any changes in precedent,
a bias does appear to permeate the opinion.
2.

"Relevant Market"

Regarding the relevant product market, the Board excluded the
entire product which related to the intervenors desire to coordinate with
other electric utility systems which were contiguous to and interconnected with Consumers Power Company.3 07 This critical omission,
which is inconsistent with the record 3 0 excludes actual competition
300. Id. at 77.
301. The misuse theory seems to require a license which is then misused [granted to
the applicant] prior to nexus being found. Thus, since prelicensing review is done before a
license issues, the review has lost all meaning if this decision stands.
302. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
303. Supra note 106, at 92-95. See part C of this section on exercise of monopoly.
304. Id. at 45.
305. 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1970).
306. See Storm v. Lumberman Mut. Cas. Co., 6 F.R.D. 355 (D.C. Cal. 1947);
Plumber Local Union 519 v. Construction Industry Stabilization Comm., 479 F.2d
1052 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
307. Initial Decision, supra note 230.
308. Transcript at 59.
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which would occur but for the unwillingness of Consumers to wheel

power. 30 9 In the hearing, the Board Chairman stated: "[W]e are here to
show ... whether the applicant has the power to prevent or influence
coordination.... ,"310 A refusal to wheel power from a third party to one
of the intervenors is clearly a "prevention of coordination," yet
this was
311
deemed not within the relevant "matters in controversy."
As stated in part D supra, the Board did not utilize section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act as the primary statutory authority. This
error was perhaps caused by the fact that the Department of Justice
appeared to be proving a Section II violation of the Sherman Act, in
presenting "unlawful use of monopoly power" evidence.3 1 2 Since the
standard of "violation" is not applicable to a section 105 hearing, proof of
an inconsistency with any antitrust law is sufficient. Assuming the
Department failed to prove a "violation" of Section II of the Sherman
Act, and assuming the board believed that to be the proper standard,
the error can be understood. The legislative history 3 3 suggests that
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 forms the broadest standard, and as
such, the most applicable antitrust provision, since violations of the
Clayton or Sherman Acts are violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act.314 In F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Service Advertising Co. it was
held that "Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . .. to stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate the
antitrust laws . . . as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of
'31 5
competition' existing violations of them.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, market foreclosures,
e.g., a denial of pre-emptive coordination or a refusal to participate in
third party wheeling, constitute antitrust violations.3 16 The Act was
designed to cover that conduct which, while not a violation of the
Sherman or Clayton Acts, runs contrary to the public policy underlying
the antitrust laws. 317 Such a standard is exactly the standard suggested
for section 105(c) cases,31 8 and is the standard which is rejected in
Consumers. Concepts, which plague Clayton Section 7 and Sherman
Section II of monopolization and conspiracy are unnecessary with the
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, and it can therefore be suggested
that the Board's most visual error (the utilization of "combination
309. Id. at 74.
310. Id. at 3986-87.
311. Id. at 44-46.
312. Supra note 232.
313. Supra note 160, at 81-156.
314. F.T.C. v. Morton Picture Advertising Serv., 344 U.S. 594 (1953); Fashion
Orginators Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S 392 (1953); Times-Picayune Publ. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 457 (1941).
315. F.T.C. v. Motion Picture, supra note 314, at 394-95.
316. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
317. 21 U.S.C. § 2135; Legislative History, supra note 160.
318. See F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Atlantic Refiningv. F.T.C.,
381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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or conspiracy," and "scheme" and the "misuse" doctrine) could have
been avoided by application of Federal Trade Commission Act § 5.
3.

"SituationInconsistent with the Antitrust Laws"

Regarding the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the
Board held:
In summary, we conclude as a matter of law that "situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws" means anticompetitive conduct,

which term includes both violations of the antitrust laws and practices
determined to be unfair by the use of the criteria quoted in Heater v.
FTC supra. In determining the existence of anticompetitive conduct,
each of the following criteria should be considered: (a) conduct which is
a violation of the antitrust laws enumerated in Section 105a of the
Atomic Energy Act, including conduct heretofore determined to be
unfair by the FTC pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act; and (b)
conduct, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, (1)which offend public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law, or otherwise, or, in other words, is within at least the
penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept
of unfairness; (2) which is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; and (3) which causes 3substantial
injury to consumers or competitors or other businessmen. 19
This description brings into play a number of basic errors, not the
least of which is the Board's confinement of situational inconsistency to
"anticompetitive conduct." This eliminates the structural approach
suggested by the courts,3 20 the legislature,3 21 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff. 22 It would have greatly simplified the
Consumers case had the Board determined that a structural approach
could be utilized, e.g., dominance (monopoly power) plus any conduct
which maintains the dominance. By controlling the regional power
exchange, the coordinating medium of high voltage transmission, and
access to nuclear power, the applicant Consumers Power maintains
monopoly power. By allegedly refusing to wheel power, coordinate, or
grant access, it acts in a manner designed to maintain its power. To find
that such conduct is not inconsistent with the antitrust laws is a
mistake. According to the precedent in Alcoa,3 23 PhiladelphiaNational
Bank, 24 American Tobacco, 2 5 and many more cases it is indisputable
that the applicant had monopoly power based simply on control
percentages. It is equally clear that Consumers' alleged refusals to
coordinate regarding transmission, or otherwise wheel power, should
have been condemned under the antitrust laws.3 26
319.
320.
(1946); E.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 50.
Supra notes 183, 184; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 13 (1948).
Supra note 160.
Supra note 221.
Supra note 183.
Supra note 48.
Supra note 320.
United States v. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 366 (1970).
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The Department of Justice introduced a simple guide into the
Consumers proceeding to clarify its position:
SITUATION INCONSISTENT WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS
NUCLEAR POWER IS ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE ONLY
WHEN MARKETED FROM LARGE UNITS-500 TO 800 MW.
NUCLEAR POWER IS CHEAPER NOW THAN ANY OTHER KIND
OF AVAILABLE POWER TO MEET GROWING LOADS.
LARGE UNITS ARE ECONOMIC ONLY IF TIED BY HIGHVOLTAGE TRANSMISSION TO THE REGIONAL POWER
EXCHANGE.
WHEN SO TIED THEY ARE MUCH MORE
ECONOMIC THAN SMALL UNITS.
APPLICANT CONTROLS THE REGIONAL POWER EXCHANGE AND REFUSES ACCESS TO OTHERS SO THAT
OTHERS ARE PRECLUDED FROM INSTALLING LARGE UNITS.
APPLICANT IS THE SOLE SOURCE OF LARGE UNIT
POWER AND HENCE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET. ITS EXCLUSION OF OTHER POTENTIAL
LICENSEES FROM THE REGIONAL POWER EXCHANGE ENABLES IT TO MONOPOLIZE THE WHOLESALE FOR RESALE
FIRM POWER MARKET.327
Quite simply, the Board excluded that which should have been
included in describing what constitutes an "inconsistency." Under the
Board ruling, market structure and performance, ease of entry, nature of
oligopoly, nature of supply and demand curves, strength and organizational diversity of competitors, and scarcity of resources may 328
be
excluded. This is, in and of itself, inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
By eliminating market structure analysis and effectively preempting the use of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act the
Board eliminated some exceedingly viable precedent for determining
"reasonable probability of an inconsistency. 3 2 9 This is unfortunate as
well as inconsistent with the legislative history of section 105.
It is intended that, in effect, the Commission will conclude whether,
in its judgment, it is reasonably probable that the activities under the
license would, when the license is issued or thereafter, be inconsistent
with any of the antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying these
33
laws.1
[Emphasis added.]

327.

Supra note 212.

328. F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 868 (1967); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966);
F.T.C. v. Consolidated Food Co., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 379 U.S. 294 (1962); A.D. NEIL, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE

U.S.A. 442 (1960). '
329. See L.G. Balfour & Co. v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1(7th Cir. 1971); cf. F.T.C.v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254 (D.D.C. 1969).

330.

S.REP. No. 1247, 91st Cong., 14, supra note 212.
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Thus, it appears that Consumers leaves in its wake only the direct
monopolization and conspiracy in restraint of trade cases, e.g., Kodak,
Alcoa, Lorain Journal,and Otter Tail.331 What may be excluded are the
section 5 materials and even the bottleneck cases, e.g., Associated Press
v. United States, Terminal Railroad, Gamco and others mentioned in
IV(B)1 supra.
4.

"Nexus"
Regarding nexus, the Board held that
[n]exus exists between otherwise lawful activities under a license or
proposed license and a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws if,
and only if, the said activities are misused so as to be a material element
and a substantial factor in a scheme or conspiracy, the purpose or effect
332
of which is to cause the creation or maintenance of said situation.

The Board has created an unworkable test, since there is no easily
shown relationship between a nuclear facility operated in an unlawful
or anticompetitive manner, and some other situation, which the Board
never really explains. The Board's discussion of nexus omits Wolf
Creek
334
33
and Louisiana Power and Light, two precedents on point.
In Consumers the Board sought to utilize nexus in a substantive
issue instead of a jurisdictional one. The "activities under the license"
are clearly the operation of the nuclear facility. It is not possible to
evaluate whether those activities will be misused prior to the issuance of
a license. Further, logic dictates that after the issuance of a license, the
activities no longer can be evaluated in a prelicensing antitrust review,
as the statute requires. 33 5 Even if the misuse concept was applied, to
complicate it with a requirement of proving a scheme or conspiracy is
absolutely not required under any interpretation of the cases or
materials related to section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act.
The requirement of nexus was established to protect a utility's
conduct which, while possibly unlawful, was simply so distant from the
licensed activities that review of that activity had no place in a licensing
hearing. 336 It was shown earlier that a system which dominates
generation and transmission, and which suddenly adds 25% generating
capacity experiences a system-wide effect. This effect is pervasive in
most cases and some would argue that all "system wide" situations
become reviewable. 337 In Consumers' case, the operation of Midland
Units and the marketing of power in the regional power exchange will
further Consumers' dominance in the bulk power market, thus main331. Supra notes 67, 69, 72, 79, 183.
332. Initial Decision, supra note 230.
333. Supra notes 106, 85.
334. Part V(B)2 of this article sets out the proper nexus standard, and little would
be accomplished by restating it here.
335. Supra note 39.
336. Supra note 85, at 619.
337. See Brief of Intervenors, filed November 13, 1975; supra note 212, at 39-45.
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taining and exacerbating the numerous inconsistencies with the
antitrust laws. The Department of Justice viewed the nexus question as
follows:
This is the nexus required by the plain language of Section 105c(5).
It is not necessary that the license activities themselves be inconsistent
with the antitrust laws or their policies. It is not necessary that the
license activities create a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws
where none was present before. It is not necessary that the effect of the
license activites on the existing situation be an effect peculiar to
nuclear power, or an effect which only the advent of nuclear power
could bring about. It is not necessary that the license activities be the
sole cause of maintaining a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws. The only thing necessary is that the license activities be found to
contribute in a significant manner to the maintenance of a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws or their underlying policies. 3 s
[Footnotes omitted.]
The nexus portion of the opinion disregards factual realities. Consumers
can only build these units by being tied into the regional power
exchange market. That fact alone, coupled with Consumers' refusal to
allow participation in that market by its captive wholesale customers
satisfies nexus for refusal to wheel, grant access or otherwise coordinate. Placed in proper perspective, nexus once again becomes a normal,
causal relationship, whose presence or absence is easily ascertained.
Placed in the Board's ruling, nexus is an unwieldy, illogical legal
problem with no resolution.
5. "Activities Under the License"
In Consumers, the Board described activities under a license, not in
terms of unit activity versus system wide conduct, but rather in terms of
the use or misuse of a licensed activity. It is in this area that it becomes
clear that the Board was intent on using "a more mature branch of the
law . . ." for analogy to section 105.3 39 The Board selected patent law
precedent, and the comparative model utilized is the patent antitrust
system. Briefly, that system deals with the assessments made by courts
on how patentee's use their patents (or licenses). This analogy is
completely inappropriate since antitrust review of patents is postlicense, post-issuance, while nuclear power antitrust review is prelicense by legislative mandate. 340 In one case, the government grant of
immunity must be alleged to be misused, while in another there is no
grant or immunity to be misused. This raises the341
question of nuclear
licensee antitrust immunity, as discussed earlier.
It is clear from the Atomic Energy Act that after a license or permit
is issued, no immunity attaches. Section 105(b) of the Atomic Energy
338.
339.
340.
341.

Supra note 232, at 176.
Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 55.
Supra note 160.
Supra note 47.
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Act 342 requires continued surveillance of licenses, including the report-

ing of any post licensing violations to the Attorney General. In one
sense, this 105(b) review is similar to patent law in that 35 U.S.C. §
154343 and attendant case law prohibit the patentee from utilizing the
344
patent in a manner which is inconsistent with the public interest.

What is critical is that the pre-issuance review of a patent includes
checks for novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, 345 while section 105(c)
pre-licensing review seeks to determine whether the granting of the
license will create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws. Accordingly, the analogy created by the Board is inappropriate.
The Board makes no other attempt to define what constitutes an
"activity under the license." It is axiomatic, however, that the following
must be included in any definition of "activity under the license."
1. Construction and operation of the two nuclear generating
units.
2. Marketing the power of the units in the wholesale for resale
firm power market.
3. Recognition and inclusion of additional transactions between
applicants and other systems, based on the fact that the successful
marketing of the power depends entirely on the reliability and
coordinated
economies which result from integration of applicants'
46
system into the regional power exchange market.

F. Remaining Arguments
As discussed earlier the Consumers Power Company dominates
high voltage transmission and generation in its service area. It was also
established that the company had a "bottleneck" over these services, and
has used this feature to its advantages. Consumers failure to deal at cost
with smaller systems seeking access to transmission or nuclear
of8
generation is inconsistent with the antitrust laws,347without a showing 34
unreasonableness or intent as required by Alcoa

and United Shoe.

More directly, United States v. Otter Tail349 conclusively established the
obligation of a dominant entity to participate in wheeling, thereby
freeing up the "bottlenecked" resources.
Otter Tail involved a major utility which had the power to block
smaller entities from alternative bulk power supplies. The Otter Tail
Company was accused of preventing the Elbow Lake Electric
Cooperative from receiving bulk power for retail distribution or
342.
343.
344.

42 U.S.C. § 2135 (b) (1970).
35 U.S.C. § 154 et seq. (1970).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).

345. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1975).

346. From Trial Aid introduced by the Department of Justice in the Consumer
Proceeding, supra note 212.
347. United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
348. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
349. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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wholesale power for resale by refusing to wheel power from third party
generating entities contiguous to the Otter Tail Company. Such facts
directly parallel the relationship between Consumers Power and many
members of the MMCPP. This denial to grant access to transmission
was defended by the Otter Tail Company on the grounds that there was
no specific congressional directive to wheel and even if there had been,
the wheeling would not have resulted in a net benefit to Otter Tail.
Identical arguments were made in Consumers.
The district court in Otter Tail dispensed with these arguments
thusly:
Here Otter Tail refuses to sell power to municipalities which would
thereby take retail power business from defendant and refuses to wheel
power for others willing to sell to these municipalities. Because of its
dominant position Otter Tail is able to deprive towns of the benefits 35
of0
competition which would result from municipally owned facilities.
The district court characterized this situation as a classic bottleneck, referring to a single firm's foreclosure of others from a scarce or
unique resource. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, specifically
preventing the utility
from refusing to "wheel" electric power over the lines from the electric
power supplies to existing or proposed municipal systems in the area,
from entering into or enforcing any contract which prohibits use of
Otter Tail's lines to "wheel" electric power to municipal electric power
systems, or from entering into or enforcing any contract which limits
the customers to whom and areas in which Otter
Tail or any other
351
electric power company may sell electric power.
Thus, it is axiomatic that dominance and control of a vital area in
commerce by a single entity results in a concomitant obligation to grant
access to that service or product, if the failure to do so would result in an
extension or maintenance of monopoly power.
Thus, Consumers'
refusals to grant access would seem to be in direct contravention to Otter
Tail and are most assuredly inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
The bottleneck theory does not have an attendant "net benefits"
defense, as the Board implied. 352 The Board, in explaining net benefits,
found that a corporation "cannot divert its property by gift or by
indirect means without a consideration or benefit to the corporation,
and such acts cannot be ratified by the board of directors."3 Regarding
electric utility coordination agreements, the Board specified that
dominant entities, specifically Consumers Power, "do not have an
obligation to enter into alleged coordination agreements from which no
35 4
net benefit results.
350. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971).
351. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1973).
352. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 64-66.
353. Id. at 65, citing In re John Rich Ent., Inc., 481 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1973).
354. Id. at 66.
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absence of a business
The law is quite clear that the presence or 355
reason does not justify anticompetitive conduct:
The fact that there were business reasons which made the arrangements desirable to the appellees ... or the fact that from other points of
view the arrangements might be deemed to have desirable consequences would be no more a legal justification for price-fixing [or other
than were the "competitive evils"
antitrust violations or inconsistencies]
3 56
in the Socony-Vacuum Oil case.
The fact is, anticompetitive practices will not be sustained merely
because, by some other evaluative system, the practices enhance
competition.3 57 This concept includes the discrediting of the argument
that economic injury to the monopolist must be considered. As the court
stated in F. T.C. v. Proctorand Gamble:358 "Possible economics cannot be
used as a defense to illegality."
Otter Tail does provide one exception to this formulation. If the
coordination "would impair [the utilities] ability to render adequate
service to its customers . . ." then the obligations of being a public
service corporation may overtake the obligations of the corporation to
act in a manner consistent with the antitrust laws.3 5 9 That limitation,
however, is remedial. It relates to judicially imposed coordination,
which wrests the net benefits question away from the utilities internal
decision making process, and places it with the courts. Additionally, in
the Consumers case the record is void of any evidence that the
participation by Consumers in any of the requested forms of coordination would have resulted in an inability on Consumers part to
continue to meet its customer demands.
It is apparent that a bottleneck monopolist may not refuse to deal in
a unique service or resource. 360 Thus, the applicability of this theory to
the electric utility industry should be a foregone conclusion.3 61 The
failure of the Board to apply the principle, and particularly to deem
Otter Tail inapplicable is an error.3 62 To argue, as does the Board, that
these situations apply only to conspiracy cases is simply incorrect, as
Otter Tail vividly points out. Of equal importance is the fact that this
"conspiracy" limitation, which is at the heart of the Board's definition of
inconsistency, 363 ignores an entire branch of law referred to as "single
355. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1941); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymens S.C. Ass'n, 274 U.S. 41, 48 (1926).
356. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 276.
357. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 312, 371 (1963).
358. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
359. 410 U.S. 366, 381 (1973).
360. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 355 (1973); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948);
Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
361. Supra notes 46 and 67; Gulf States Co. v. Federal Power Co., 411 U.S. 747
(1973).
362. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 95.
363. Id. at 47-50.
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firm monopolization, ' 364 and unnecessarily limits section 105(c) proceedings to the inconsistencies found in joint applications thus frustrating an entire legislative scheme, 365 and ignoring a substantial body
of case law.366
Quite simply, a monopolist may not use his monopoly position in any
manner which extends that monopoly position.3 67 This is as true for
single firm monopolization as it is in conspiracy cases. "Refusal to sell
on the part of a [single] producer having monopoly control in order to
influence prices or maintain or extend its effective market control is
illegal, as is any other device designed to accomplish these ends. '368 This
applies to refusals to transmit third party power (wheel), refusals to
coordinate generation, and refusals to grant unit access.
The intervenors made several arguments to further support this
position which bear repeating. 369 First, the Board propounded the
theory that if Consumers Power was to interconnect and coordinate as
requested, it would be "saving a drowning man," 370 and there is no duty
to save a drowning man. This is incorrect when placed in the context of
public utilities, who, as the possessors of government grants, do have an
obligation to coordinate where it is in the public interest. 371 Second,
apart from the public utility in the public domain argument, there are
obligations placed upon dominant utilities to act within the bounds of
antitrust laws and assist other entities despite their obligation to
shareholders to maximize profits.372 Finally, and most important, when
Consumers Power Company joined the Michigan Pool with Detroit
Edison, it became involved in a series of agreements and arrangements
which, but for Federal Power Commission exemptions, would be
deemed violations of the antitrust laws as conspiracies. The quid pro
quo of such exemptions has always been the obligation to maintain an
open door and not refuse to deal.3 73 This price Consumers was unwilling
to pay.
One last point must be considered. The Consumers decision holds
that the facilities involved are not unique, and thus regardless of what
the bottleneck law is or is not, there has been no denial of a unique
364. OPPENHEIM AND WESTON, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 223-96 (1972).
365. Supra note 160.
366. Supra note 328.
367. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
368. Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D. N.Y.
1958) rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959).
369. Brief in Support of Exceptions of the Intervenors, filed November 1975, supra
note 232.
370. Initial Decision, supra note 230, at 78.
371. F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); Niagara Power Co. v. F.P.C.,
379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
372. New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCalls, 245 U.S. 345 (1971).
373. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596(1972); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Associated Press v. United States 326 U.S. 1
(1945); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
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resource.374 This is so, the decision maintains, since the MMCPP and
other utilities, which appear to be adversely affected by the denial of
access to nuclear power and the denial of transmission services, can
easily build 375
their own smaller units or purchase wholesale power from
Consumers.
This "non-uniqueness" theory is factually unsubstantiated. Apart
from the economic and environmental factors, which make construction
of similar facilities virtually impossible,3 76 the postulation ignores one
important aspect of the antitrust law, namely the obligation of the
monopolist not to destroy alternatives which could make lesser entities
competitive. 377 Moreover, even if such units could be built, the
dominance by Consumers over high voltage transmission and future
transmission rights of way would effectively preclude optimal use of
such units. The excess power which must be sold would "die" on line due
to the denial of entry by Consumers to the regional power exchange
markets.37 8
G. Relief

The question of relief or remedy was not considered in the initial
Consumers decision because of the holding in favor of the company.
Nonetheless, the record does reveal that Consumers Power fully
understands its dominance. A Consumers executive recognized that if
Consumers' customers have no alternative source of low cost bulk
power, they will continue to be forced to purchase from Consumers,
regardless of the power package offered by the Company.3 79 Conversely,
ownership of a percentage of the Midland Nuclear Plant, and/or the
ability to purchase bulk power and make coordination agreements
elsewhere, would allow the MMCPP membership to compete, or at least
reduce costs in their various bulk power dealings.38 0 Further, access to
Consumers high voltage system would greatly increase the bargaining
position and power supply options available to the municipal systems.3'
If such access appears to be a great deal to ask of a dominant entity,
it should be noted that such arrangements exist in almost every state
and involve the majority of private and public systems. 3 82 For example,
the Western Energy Supply and Transmission Associates (WEST) has
374. Initial Decision, supra note 230.
375. Id.
376. Transcript at 2558-2560, 6645,2808,2292,4431,4333, which reflects testimony
of the parties, including the President of Consumers Power that indicates that these
facilities are unique and cannot be constructed in any practical sense by the smaller
systems.
377. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); and Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
378. See Transcript at 4664:29 and 5090:14-16 (Prepared testimony of Dr. Gutman
and Engineer Chayavadhanangkur).
379. Transcript at 8231.
380. Transcript at 4348-4350 (Testimony of Fletcher).
381. Id. at 4334.

382.

NATIONAL POWER SURVEY,

supra note 133, at III, 3-193 (1970).
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tweny-three utilities in nine southwestern states, comprised of twelve
private investor-owned systems, five municipal systems, three generation and transmission cooperatives, two irrigation districts, and one
state electric authority.3 8 The New England Power Pool Agreement
(NEPOOL) is open to all systems in New England and collectively owns
8 4
and operates a nuclear generation system.3
NEPOOL is itself
interconnected with the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland
Interconnection System (PJM). These groups, along with the Northwest Powers Pool (NWPP), Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and many others,
are large, coordinated, open power pools.388 They all operate on the
principle that an open, interconnected system will result in the
opportunity for maximum efficiency, profit, and least cost. It is
likewise true that such systems maximize competitive opportunities.
Thus the request for access to generation or transmission is neither
novel, nor does it require a charitable heart of Consumers, as the Board
seems to imply.3 86 Rather, it is the normal course of business for many
electric systems. In Michigan, it is a different story than for NEPOOL,
PJM, WEST, or other coordinated systems. Requests for emergency
power go unanswered, (Lansing's request-Consumers denial), 87 small
systems are compelled to sign bulk power contracts and to adhere to
clauses which limit the size of new generating units they can build and
which deny them the opportunity to purchase wholesale power from
third parties, (Consumer and Coldwater, Holland).3 88
Accordingly, broad relief provisions would be in order, should the
Consumers decision be reversed. The necessity that these be imposed by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is clear. While the Consumers
board suggests that the Federal Power Commission would be a more
appropriate forum for some of these matters, the jurisdiction Qf the
Federal Power Commission is generally limited to rates, and in any
event, it is clear that they cannot order "system interconnection for the
purposes of coordinated operation or require systems to engage in
coordinated development for purposes of economy and efficiency. ' ' 9
Likewise, the record shows that Federal Power Commission regulation
cannot assure logical dissemination
of advanced electrical and nuclear
390
technology in Michigan.

383. N.R.C. Staff, "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", filed
October 8, 1974 in Consumers supra note 212, at 136.
384. Id. at 137.
385. Id. at 138-43.
386. Initial Decision, supra note 230.
387. Supra note 383, at 144.
388. Id.; see also, supra note 212 (Prepared Testimony of Chayavadhanangkur at

21).

389. "Proposed Findings," supranote 383, at 146, and Federal Power Act, Part II, §
201(a) and (b) (1967).
390. Transcript at 4205-37 (Testimony of Dr. Wein).
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Additionally, the proposed broad-based relief has been imposed in
the past in 19 separate instances by settlement agreements. 391 The relief
is designed to "pry open to competition a market that has been closed
by defendant's illegal restraints. 39 2 Indeed, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission would be required (in the event of a reversal of Consumers)
to restore competition,39 3 as opposed to merely returning the market to
the status quo.3 94

The Commission may have a broad choice in

determining remedies, since inconsistencies which can be found to
violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can be remedied
in any manner which will revive competition. 395 Additionally, it is
presumed that the remedy selected would be chosen after an expert
evaluation of the problem by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an
administrative agency which has jurisdiction over the particular
396
activity, and that the choice would not be disturbed by the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The progression of the antitrust enforcement system from its
economically naive inception to the present reveals one of the more
successful programs in Twentieth Century governmental economic
regulation. It is only a highly sophisticated antitrust system which can
allow the growth of concentration as an economic necessity and still
preserve competition by enforcing laws, such as section 105(c), which
maintain coordinated activities thus insuring yardstick competition and
wholesale bulk power competition.
At first gloss, coordination and concentration would seem antithetical to the concept of pure competition, if indeed "pure competition"
was economically practicable. However, the nature of the electric
utility industry is such that actual competition exists at a level which is
not easily understood, e.g., the concept of yardstick competition and third
party wheeling which allows wholesale bulk power exchanges in a very
competititve manner. These competitive formulations do achieve the
traditional goals of efficiency and minimum cost, but even these goals
are difficult to assess in a setting as complex as the electric generating,
producing, and distribution markets.
Two things are quite clear, however. First, the addition of 1300 MW
of nuclear generated power to one system is a very real competitive
advantage over competing systems which do not or cannot participate
directly in nuclear generation. Second, monopoly control of 100% of
high voltage transmission is an awesome and impregnable barrier to
entry in the regional power exchange markets. These two realities, if
391. See Doc. Nos. 50-302; 50-269, 270, 287; 50-361, 362; 50-341; 50-369, 370; 50-367;
50-366; 50-404, 405; 50-400, 401, 402, 403; 50-413, 414; 50-424, 425, 426, 427; 50-416, 417;
50-389; 50-434, 435; 50-445, 446; 50-452, 453; 50-458, 459; 50-460; 50-461, 462; 50-463,464.
392. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
393. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).

394.
395.
396.

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
L.G. Balfour & Co. v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
Id.
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unchecked, spell almost certain doom for systems which do not have
access to nuclear power or high voltage transmission. With demise of
these systems follows the demise of organizational diversity and the
demise of regional bulk power sale's direct competition.
Control over nuclear power and high voltage transmission by a
single dominant entity does create an inconsistency with the antitrust
laws and must not be sanctioned by virtue of an unconditioned
government license to operate such facilities. The failure of the
Consumers Board to so condition the licenses represents critical errors
in legal analysis, an improper assessment of national economic policies,
theoretical confusion, and a general disregard of the history of the
economics of antitrust enforcement over the last three quarters of a
century.

